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All the [Athletes] Are Equal, but Some Are
More Equal than Others: An Objective
Evaluation of Title IX's Past, Present, and
Recommendations for Its Future
J. Brad Reich*
On June 27, 2002, President George W. Bush formed a panel' to
review Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.2 According to
Education Secretary Rod Paige, the purpose of the review was to
examine the ways Title IX can be strengthened while ensuring "fairness
for all college athletes."3 The President's panel added fuel to an already
burning fire. Title IX has been embroiled in public controversy since its
inception. While Title IX's language seems well intentioned on its face, 4
*
Professor, Legal Studies in Business, University of St. Thomas; B.B.A.,
University of Iowa; J.D. with Honors, Drake University School of Law; L.L.M.,
University of Missouri-Columbia. I would like to thank Jean Stemlight, the Hon.
Carlynn D. Grupp, and Sharon and Alison Lemon for their support and assistance.
1. I will refer to this panel as the "Bush Panel" for purposes of this Article. Despite
the furor that has surrounded the subject matter the Bush panel will address, the
recommendations of the panel are only advisory and not binding on the President or
Congress. However, that furor may well be indicative of the uproar Title IX incites in
society as a whole and may provide guidance to the President or Congress on how to
proceed on the issues, though not guidance of a purely substantive nature.
The fifteen members of the Bush Panel are: Cynthia Cooper (former WNBA
player and coach), Ted Leland (Athletics Director, Stanford University), Percy Bates
(Education Professor, University of Michigan), Bob Bowlsby (Athetics Director,
University of Iowa), Gene DeFillipo (Athletics Director, Boston College), Donna de
Varona (U.S. Olympic Committee member), Julie Foudy (Captain, U.S. Women's Soccer
Team), Tom Griffith (General Counsel, Brigham Young University), Cary Groth
(Athletics Director, Northern Illinois University), Lisa Graham Keegan (CEO, Education
Leadership Council), Muffet McGraw (Women's Basketball Coach, Notre Dame
University), Rita Simon (Professor of Public Affairs, American University), Mike Slive
(Commissioner, Southeastern Conference), Graham Spanier (President, Penn State
University), and Deborah Yow (Athletics Director, University of Maryland).
2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2002).
3. See Erik Brady, Bush Picks Panel To Review Title IX, USA TODAY, June 28,
2002, at C 1.
4. "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any
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views on Title IX are sharply divided and loudly debated. On one side
are those that laud Title IX as the law that opened up athletic
opportunities to women.5 On the other are those who strongly condemn
Title IX as a form of affirmative action for women that has resulted in
the termination of many men's athletic opportunities.6 Many of those
professing knowledge of the true effects of Title IX have embarked on a
swirling, thrust and parry debate, largely driven by emotion and bias.7
education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance...." 20 U.S.C. §
168 1(a).
5. See, e.g., Jessica Gavora, TILTING THE PLAYING FIELD: SCHOOLS, SPORTS, SEX
AND TITLE IX 15 (2002) ("For most Americans, Title IX is synonymous with women and
sports.").
6. See, e.g., Amy Bauer, If You Build It They Will Come: Establishing Title IX
Compliance in Interscholastic Sports as a Foundationfor Achieving Gender Equity, 7
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 983, 984 (2001) ("Gender equity in sports is encountering
several problems as a result of the preoccupation with numerical parity at the college
level, including.., the increasingly popular and derogatory impression that Title IX,
rather than being an anti-discrimination statute, is an affirmative action plan that furthers
the cause of female athletes at the expense of their male counterparts.").
7. See, e.g., Shawn Griffin, Its Time To Put the AX to Title IX, (May 30, 2002),
available at www.sportsterminal.com/view/index.asp?pieceid=157 (last visited July 7,
2002) (citing with approval an email stating: "The politically correct police have
infiltrated sports! They call it Title IX, and the National Organization of men haters, uh I
mean women, is helping to ruin male sports opportunities."); Sally Jenkins, Title IX
Opponents a Bunch of Sad Sacks, WASH. POST, June 24, 2002, at DI, available at
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32977-2002Jun23.html (last visited July 7,
2002) (arguing that Title IX's "alarming effects are everywhere in evidence. For one
thing, thanks to Title IX, some college football teams might have to fly commercial to
Hawaii this season, instead of charter. And they probably won't get a new soft serve ice
cream dispenser for the athletic department cafeteria, or a locker room pool table with
custom-dyed felt in school colors, or a mahogany conference table in the shape of a
mascot, inlaid in ebony. There's only one direction in which to point the finger of blame
for this-straight at women. The new swine."); see also E.J. Dionne Jr., Wrestling with
Title IX, WASH. POST, June 4, 2002, at A17 ("You can approach some issues with
Olympian detachment. But the controversy over Title IX, the law that bars sexual
discrimination in education, is, for me at least, not one of them.").
Other authors have clearly based certain presumptions on stereotypes-the types
of stereotypes that contribute to the attitudes and emotions displayed above. See, e.g.,
Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind Title IX,
34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 13, 93 (2001) ("Masculinity is linked with male sport in
general, but with certain sports in particular. The more rugged, powerful contact sports
are the preferred vehicles through which males prove their masculinity and, not
coincidentally, the sports that are often the most valued in school athletic programs in
terms of the resources, benefits, and prestige that accompany those programs."); Felice
M. Duffy, Twenty-Seven Years Post Title IX: Why Gender Equity in College Athletics
Does Not Exist, 19 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 67, 90 (2000) ("Because men occupied a large
percentage of the leadership positions, they were able to enact and support policies in line
with the male model that keep women in sports in an inferior position.").
This sort of heated commentary has been directed at the Bush Panel as well.
at
See,
e.g.,
Commission
To
Recommend a
Weakened Title IX,
www.womensportsfoundation.org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues/rights/article.html?record=938
(last visited Dec. 30, 2002) (beginning with a picture of a wolf wrapped in sheep's
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The purpose of this Article is to objectively examine the stated intent,
actual application, and real world effects of Title IX on Division I
intercollegiate athletics, and to propose recommendations for future
interpretation and use. 8
An initial disclaimer is in order; I am from Iowa. Iowa is arguably
the preeminent amateur wrestling state in the country. 9 That fact is
important, because living in Iowa I was subjected to a great deal of antiTitle IX sentiment based on the perception that Title IX had caused the
termination of many men's collegiate athletic programs, with wrestling
suffering the greatest casualties.1 0 While I intended to examine Title IX
from an objective and empirical basis, we are all human, and part of me
may have hoped for data establishing that Title IX was in fact causing
the termination of men's athletic programs. As I will discuss, that is not
what I found.
This Article is comprised of two sections. In Section 1, I will
discuss the three sources that have made Title IX what it is today:
statutory language and administrative agency interpretation, judicial
interpretation, and responses to these interpretations by educational
institutions.
In Subsection A, I will examine Title IX's plain language and
statutory interpretation. Two things are particularly important. First,
Title IX was not created to address gender inequities in intercollegiate
athletics, it was created to address gender inequities in the opportunity to
pursue higher education. Second, the broad expansion of Title IX to
intercollegiate athletics is largely a function of the Department of
Education's ("DED") Office of Civil Rights ("OCR"), the administrative
agency responsible for enforcing Title IX. The OCR's actions and
agenda have not only applied Title IX where it was not intended by the
plain language of the statute, but have also created only one real way for
an educational institution to be Title IX compliant, a standard known as
clothing); Phony Study Commission Issues Radical Recommendations, at
www.now.org/issues/legislat/200302.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
8. The Bush Panel met in late January of 2003 to review proposed

recommendations and to vote on which of those recommendations should be forwarded
to Secretary Paige. It appears that the Secretary is supposed to receive a final report from
the Bush Panel by February 28, 2003. It is unclear when the Secretary will release the
contents of that report to the President and/or public and what weight, if any, the

Secretary will give to the report and recommendations.
9. The University of Iowa has won at least nineteen national wrestling
championships, including nine straight from 1978-1986. Iowa State University wrestler
Cael Sanderson recently compiled a 179-0 record in college to become the first Division I
wrestler to ever go undefeated for his collegiate career.
10. Those feelings most recently manifested themselves in the form of a pending
suit. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 02 Civ. 00072 EGS
(D.D.C. filed 2002).
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"substantial proportionality."" 1
In Subsection B, I will review the primary judicial decisions
defining and interpreting Title IX. I will spend a significant amount of
time analyzing and critiquing the decision in Cohen v. Brown
University'2 because it established the framework for every subsequent
court's analysis of Title IX compliance. Two things will become clear
from this analysis. First, the courts give great deference to OCR
interpretations and recommendations when determining Title IX
application. Second, because of that deference, Title IX has become a
quota system that can only be met by achieving substantial
proportionality.
In Subsection C, I will examine educational institutions' responses
to Title IX. Facing the OCR's broad expansion of Title IX, and the
narrow judicial interpretations requiring substantial proportionality,
schools find themselves in a "no-win" situation. Most schools simply
cannot afford to both add women's athletic opportunities and maintain
men's. As a result, schools have pursued substantial proportionality by
both cutting men's athletic opportunities while keeping women's athletic
opportunities constant, and by adding women's athletic opportunities that
frequently do not reflect women's athletic interests.
Finally, in Subsection D, I will examine the real world effects of the
above interpretations, decisions, and responses. First, I will look at
whether the great growth in women's intercollegiate athletic
opportunities is a direct result of Title IX. Second, I will consider
whether the reduction in men's intercollegiate athletic opportunities is a
direct result of Title IX. I will argue that there is no clear empirical
answer to either question.
In Section II, I will look to Title IX's future. I recognize that it is
likely that Title IX will remain as it is written and that the OCR will
continue to be responsible for its enforcement. However, I propose three
changes for Title IX's application and interpretation.
In Subsection A, I will propose that the definition of "equal" in
"equal opportunity in intercollegiate athletics"' 3 be changed to reflect

11. "Substantial proportionality" requires that the number of athletic opportunities
provided to a gender must be equivalent to the percentage of that gender in overall
undergraduate enrollment.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 58-94.
13. See Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413,
71,414 (Dec. 11, 1979) (policy interpretation of Title IX and intercollegiate athletics),
available at www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/docs/t9interp.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2002)
[hereinafter Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972]. The Summary of the
Final Policy Interpretation reads:
The final Policy Interpretation clarifies the meaning of "equal opportunity" in
intercollegiate athletics. It explains the factors and standards set out in the law
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pragmatic issues. I will argue that all intercollegiate sports are not
"equal" in terms of public interest, potential for school notoriety and
exposure, or revenues produced, and all athletic opportunities should not
be treated equally for purposes of Title IX. I will propose that individual
profit-generating sports programs be exempt from Title IX compliance
requirements at the option of the program's host institution.
In Subsection B, I will turn our attention to the OCR. The OCR is
responsible for interpreting and applying Title IX. I will submit that the
OCR's current interpretation of "opportunity in intercollegiate
athletics"' 14 is subjective when it should be objective.15 As a result, the
OCR has defined "opportunity" in a way that simultaneously mandated
creation of athletic opportunities that have not drawn female participants,
while excluding activities that would fit a traditional definition of sport.
The primary example will be competitive cheerleading. If competitive
cheerleading, and other sports desired by female athletes but shunned by
the OCR, were analyzed using an objective application of the standards,
the activities would constitute athletic opportunities under Title IX. If
such activities were recognized as athletic opportunities for purposes of
Title IX, the current disparity between men's and women's athletic
opportunities would be significantly reduced, and female athletes would
be able to participate in sports where they have displayed a clear interest.
Finally, in Subsection C, I will argue that the courts should apply
the compliance analysis set forth in the DED's final Policy Interpretation
on Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics. That Interpretation allows a
school to comply with Title IX in any of three ways: by demonstrating
substantial proportionality, by demonstrating a history and continuing
practice of program expansion, or by demonstrating that the interests and
abilities of the members of the underrepresented sex have been fully and
effectively accommodated by present programs.16 As I will discuss,
judicial and administrative agency decisions have limited schools'
abilities to comply with Title IX to such an extent that schools may now
only comply under "substantial proportionality." I submit that the three
options should be considered equally and in a manner that carries out the
language and intent of Title IX and its Regulations.
and regulation which the Department will consider in determining whether an
institution's intercollegiate athletics program complies with the law and
regulations. It also provides guidance to assist institutions in determining
whether any disparities which may exist between men's and women's programs
are justifiable and nondiscriminatory.
Id.
Id.
15. The OCR is to apply specific criteria to determine if an activity constitutes an
"athletic opportunity" for purposes of Title IX. See infra text accompanying note 194.
16. See Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, supra note 13, at 71,418.
14.
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7

The Language of Title IX andAdministrative Agency Interpretation

Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX") was
signed into law on June 23, 1972.1 8 Title IX's original language is
simultaneously concise and vague. The combination set the stage for the
debate that continues today:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subject to discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance. 19

Title IX was modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VI"). 20 The well-known purpose of Title VI was to prohibit racebased discrimination in federally funded programs. 2 ' Similarly, Title IX
was designed to prohibit sex-based discrimination in educational
activities receiving federal funds.22 It is important to understand that
Title IX's original language did not say anything about addressing
gender-based discrimination in intercollegiate athletics, 23 and there is
very little mention about athletics in Title IX's scant legislative history.24
However, in 1974, pursuant to what became known as the "Javits
17. For a comprehensive itemization of Title IX's evolution, see Diane Heckman,
Scoreboard: A Concise Chronological Twenty-Five Year History of Title IX Involving
Interscholasticand IntercollegiateAthletics, 7 SETON HALL J.SPORTS L. 391 (1997).
18. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2002).
19. See id. § 1681(a).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994); see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696
(1979) ("The drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed that it would be interpreted and
applied as Title VI had been during the preceding eight years.").
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer ...(a) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.").
22. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704 (identifying the two primary objectives of Title IX as
"avoid[ing] the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices" and
"provid[ing] individual citizens effective protection against those practices").
23. See 118 CONG. REC. 5808 (1972) (Remarks of Sen. Bayh) ("According to the
statute's senate sponsor, Title IX was intended to 'provide for the women of America
something that is rightfully theirs-an equal chance to attend the schools of their choice,
to develop the skills they want, and to apply those skills with the knowledge that they
will have a fair chance to secure the jobs of their choice with equal pay for equal
work."').
24. See generally Charles Spitz, Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics as
Mandated by Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972: Fair or Foul?, 21
SETON HALL LEGIS. J.621, 627 (1997).
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Amendment, 2 5 Title IX was made applicable to intercollegiate sports
when Congress directed the then existing Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare ("HEW") to promulgate regulations that
"include with respect to intercollegiate athletic activities reasonable
26
provisions considering the nature of particular sports.,
Originally, HEW's Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") was the
administrative sub-agency responsible for enforcing Title IX. 2 7 On July
21, 1975, HEW issued its "Final Title IX Regulation ' 28 in an attempt to
clarify what was required for educational institutions under Title IX.
HEW mandated a three-year window for compliance. 29 "By the end of
1978, the [DED] had received nearly 100 complaints alleging
discrimination in athletics against more than 50 institutions of higher
education., 30 The DED determined that it needed to further clarify what
constituted compliance under Title IX. 31 The result was the DED's 1979
32
final "Policy Interpretation: Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics.,
This Interpretation would shape Title IX judicial decisions to the present
day, and, in turn, those judicial decisions would shape decisions of
educational institutions.
Pursuant to the Interpretation, an educational institution must
"accommodate effectively the interests and abilities of students to the
extent necessary to provide equal opportunity in the selection of sports
and levels of competition available to members of both sexes. 33 The
25. Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484, 612 (Aug.
21, 1974).

26. Id. Further amendments were proposed, but failed to pass. On May 20, 1974,
Sen. John Tower introduced an amendment to Title IX that would have exempted
revenue-producing sports from Title IX compliance calculations. Amend. 1343 to S.
1539, 120 Cong. Rec. 15,322 (1974).

"Tower Amendment."

The legislation is generally referred to as the

See also H.R. 8394, 82nd Cong. (1975); S. 2106, 84th Cong.

(1977).

I use the term "made applicable" in the text accompanying this note because I
have not seen any information that convinces me that Congress was specifically directing
HEW to apply Title IX to intercollegiate sports. Rather, it is my sense that Congress was
directing HEW to draft regulations to identify if, when, and how Title IX might be
applicable to intercollegiate athletics.
27. In 1980, the Department of Education Organization Act transferred HEW's
Office for Civil Rights to the newly created Department of Education ("DED"). The
DED's Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") became primarily responsible for administering
Title IX. See 20 U.S.C. § 3401 (2002).
28. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (June 4, 1975). The rule was signed by President Ford on
May 27, 1975 and became effective as law on July 21, 1975. Id. at 24,137.
29. Id.
30. Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, supra note 13, at 71,413.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 71,415 ("This Policy Interpretation clarifies the obligations which
recipients of Federal aid have under Title IX to provide equal opportunities in athletic
programs.").
33. Id. at 71,417.
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Interpretation gave only vague guidance on how that plan was to be
carried out:
In effectively accommodating the interests and abilities of
male and female athletes, institutions must provide both the
opportunity for individuals of each sex to participate in
intercollegiate competition, and for athletes of each sex to
have competitive team schedules which equally reflect
their abilities.34
The Interpretation went on to specify that an institution fully and
when it satisfies
effectively accommodates those interests and abilities
35
any single prong of the following three prong test.
level participation
Whether intercollegiate
Prong I:
opportunities for male and female students are provided in
numbers substantially proportionate to their respective
enrollments.36
The governing principle for this prong is that athletic opportunities
should be available on a substantially proportionate basis to the number
of male and female undergraduates in the institution as a whole.37 To
satisfy this requirement, a school must demonstrate that its percentage of
female athletic opportunities (assuming females are the traditionally
underrepresented gender) is substantially proportionate to its percentage
of female undergraduates. 38 Accordingly, if 53 percent of a school's
undergraduate student population is women, then women must be
provided 53 percent of the athletic opportunities. If not, the school is
presumed to be discriminating on the basis of gender and has the burden
of proving its innocence under either of the remaining two parts of the
test.39
34. Id. at 71,418.
35. The adopted final Policy Interpretation created the three prong test. A two prong
test was also proposed but rejected. That test would have required an institution to either:
1.Follow a policy of development of its women's athletic program to
provide the participation and competition opportunities needed to

accommodate the growing interests and abilities of women, or
II. To demonstrate that it was effectively (and equally) accommodating
the athletic interests and abilities of students, particularly as the interests
and abilities of women students developed.
Id. at 71,414.
36. Id. at 71,418.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Gavora, supra note 5, at 36.
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Prong II: Where the members of one sex have been and are
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the
institution can show a history and continuing practice of program
expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing
interests and abilities of the members of that sex.4
The governing principle for Prong II is that male and female
and
equivalent treatment, benefits,
athletes should receive
opportunities.4 ' On its face, Prong II seems to mean that a school that is
not in compliance with Prong I could make changes to reach compliance
under Prong II even without demonstrating substantially proportionate
numbers.
Prong III: Where the members of one sex are under represented
among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a
continuing practice of program expansion such as that cited
above, whether it can be fully demonstrated that the interests and
abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and
42
effectively accommodated by the present program.
The governing principle for Prong III is that the athletic interests
and abilities of male and female students must be equally effectively
accommodated.43 No guidance was provided to clarify what "equally
effectively accommodated" meant or would require.
B. JudicialDecisions
The OCR did not expand the scope and interpretation of Title X on
its own. The United States Supreme Court set the judicial tone in 1979
when it held in Cannon v. University of Chicago4 that there was an
implied private right of action under Title IX. 4 5 The Court found this
right even though there clearly was no express statutory provision
allowing a private party to bring suit to enforce Title IX compliance.4 6
40.
41.
42.

Title LX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, supra note 13, at 71,418.
Id.
Id.

43.

Id.

44.

441 U.S. 677 (1979).

45.

Id. at 709.
A private right of action means that an individual person could bring suit, and
attempt to recover damages, alleging an injury arising out of an institution's failure to
comply with Title IX. If a private right of action were not found to exist, the remedy for
non-compliance would be that the federal government could terminate funds going to the
non-complying school, but the individual victim could not recover individual relief.

46.

Id. at 717.
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Based on the development of later cases, Cannon not only created this
implied right, it also signaled that the courts would be willing, and even
eager, to expand Title IX application and would not be limited by the
language of the statute.
The Court's sole departure from judicial broadening of Title IX
came five years later in the case of Grove City College v. Bell.47 In
Grove City, the Court held that only athletic programs directly receiving
federal funds were governed by Title IX. 48 Congress responded in 1988
with the Civil Rights Restoration Act. 49 The Act mandated that all
educational institutions that received direct or indirect federal financial
assistance were bound by Title IX. 50 Title IX now applies to virtually
every public and private two and four year school because most post
secondary schools have students that receive federal financial assistance
through federal student loans. 5'
The next significant high court Title IX case came in 1992. In
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,52 the Supreme Court
continued Cannon's judicial expansion of Title IX and held that
compensatory damages were recoverable under the Act. 53 Until
Franklin, it was generally believed that Title IX only allowed courts to
issue equitable relief.54 While Cohen v. Brown University55 gets most of
the acclaim for strengthening Title IX, Franklin created a fundamental
change in the pursuit of Title IX based causes of action. 56 Franklin made

47.

465 U.S. 555 (1984).

48. Id. at 570-71.
49. The Act became law on March 22, 1988 after Congress overrode the veto by
then President Reagan. At least one author has argued that Congress misinterpreted the
legislative history of Title IX and, because of that misinterpretation, overruled Grove City
College when creating the Civil Rights Restoration Act. See generally Christopher Paul
Reuscher, Giving the Bat Back to Casey: Suggestions To Reform Title IX's Inequitable
Application to IntercollegiateAthletics, 35 AKRON L. REV. 117 (2001).
50. See generally Karen Czapanskiy, Grove City College v. Bell: Touchdown or
Touchback?, 43 MD. L. REV. 379 (1984).

51. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GENDER EQUITY: MEN'S AND WOMEN'S
PARTICIPATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 6 (Dec. 2000) ("Because most post secondary
schools have students who receive federal financial assistance, such as federal or
federally backed student loans, Title IX applies to the large majority of 2-year and 4-year
schools, both public and private.").
52. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
53. Id. at 66.
54. Duffy, supranote 7, at 10.
56. 101 F.3d 155 (lst Cir. 1996).
56. Franklin was decided in 1992. At least one author states that as recently as
"1991, nearly twenty years after Title IX was born, the law, by itself, could claim
virtually no practical effect on the gender landscape of American athletics." See David
Tell, The Myth of Title IX, at
http://www.boundless.org/2000/departments/campusculture/aOO00169.html (last visited
July 2, 2002).
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Title IX a popular cause of action for plaintiffs' attorneys, creating a
strong supplement to the already broad powers of the OCR. 57
The most significant case in Title IX development is clearly Cohen
v. Brown University.58 Every Title IX decision since Cohen, with one
exception, 59 has followed the Cohen analysis and rationale. 60 It is a bit
misleading to refer to Cohen as a single case. Cohen is more accurately
described as a long and complex series of decisions, centered around the
First Circuit's 1993 decision. 61 The suit was originally filed as a class
action, charging Brown University and various administrators with
violating Title IX for demoting women's gymnastics and volleyball
62
The true
programs from university level status to varsity status sports.
3
crux of Cohen's evolution can be found deep in Cohen 116 and repeated
in Cohen IV."64 "Whereas Title IX is largely aspirational, and thus a
'loosely laced buckskin' that must be accorded a sweep as broad as its
language. ' To carry out that broad sweep, the courts turned first and
primarily to administrative guidance. Specifically, the court looked to
HEW's 1979 final Policy Interpretation.66 That Interpretation created the
previously discussed three prong test. 67 Pursuant to that Interpretation,
Brown University complied with Title IX if it satisfied any of the three
prongs. The following is an analysis and critique of the Cohen court's

57. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 51, at 5 ("In addition [to the
activities of OCR] private lawsuits may have played an important role in Title IX
enforcement."). Private Title IX suits became much easier to pursue with enactment of
The Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act ("EADA"). See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(g) (2002). The
EADA required all colleges and universities to provide specific information about the
gender composition of their sports programs. As a result, "the EADA created a ready
made client shopping list for trial lawyers. One glance at a school's EADA submission
shows a would-be plaintiffs attorney whether or not a school is vulnerable to a Title LX
lawsuit." See Gavora, supra note 5, at 44.
58. 101 F.3dat 155.
59. See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D.La. 1996) (analyzing
Title IX compliance under the Cohen model but disagreeing with the Cohen rationale)..
60. See, e.g., Homer v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n., 206 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2000);
Roberts v. Colo. State Univ., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993); Beasley v. Ala. State Univ.,
966 F. Supp. 1117 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Bryant v. Colgate Univ., 1996 WL 328446
(N.D.N.Y. 1996).
61. The most important Cohen cases, for purposes of this discussion, are Cohen v.
Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st
Cir. 1993) ("Cohen II"), Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), and
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Cohen IV"). The lineage appears
to end with Cohen v. Brown Univ., No. 99-485-B, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20714 (D.N.H.
Dec. 5, 2001), which decided the final rehearing regarding attorney fees.
62. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 891.
63. Id.at 902.
64. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 177.
65. Id.
66. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 980.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
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interpretation of each of the prongs.
Prong I:
Whether intercollegiate level participation
opportunities for male and female students are provided in
numbers substantially proportionate to their respective
enrollments.6 8
The Cohen court was clear that the Policy Interpretation of 1979
was entitled to substantial deference. 69 Applying that deference, the
court found that intercollegiate athletic opportunities offered by an
institution are properly measured by counting the number of actual
participants on intercollegiate teams. 70 The court recognized that Brown
University indisputably offered male athletic opportunities that exceeded
the percentage of male undergraduate enrollment and held that Brown
University failed Prong I because there was no substantial
proportionality. 71 The court then went on to clarify exactly what Prong I
72
meant in the grand scheme of Title IX compliance analysis.
The court began by acknowledging that Title IX "does not mandate
strict numerical equality between the gender balance of a college's
athletic program and the gender balance of its student body. 7 3 It then
held that Brown University failed Prong I because of a 13 percent
disparity between men's and women's athletic opportunities.7 4 In the
end, the court held that substantial proportionality was a rebuttable
presumption for Title IX compliance.75 If a school could demonstrate
substantial proportionality, it complied with Title IX. If not, it could
attempt to comply under either of the remaining two prongs. Analyzing
possible compliance under those prongs makes it clear that what the
Cohen court really did, despite what it said, was create a single prong
(Prong I) test to determine Title IX compliance.
Prong II: Where the members of one sex have been and are
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the
68.
69.

See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (June 4, 1975).
Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 988 ("Moreover, considerable weight should be given to

[the OCR's] interpretation of its own regulations.").
70. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 192 (D.R.I. 1995) ("Every varsity
team member is therefore a varsity 'participant."').
71. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 981 (finding that Brown's undergraduate enrollment
during that time was 52.4 percent men and 47.6 percent women, but of the 894
undergraduate athletes participating on the intercollegiate varsity teams, 63.3 percent
were men and 36.7 percent were women).
72. Id.at 991-99.
73. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993).
74. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 211.
75. Cohen v. Brown Univ. 101 F.3d 155, 171 (lst Cir. 1996).
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institution can show a history and continuing practice of program
expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing
interests and abilities of that sex.76
Prong 1I allows an educational institution to comply with Title IX
by demonstrating a "continuing practice of program expansion" for
creating athletic opportunities for the underrepresented gender. Title IX
was enacted in 1972. Cohen was filed in 1991. Brown University added
almost all of its women's athletic teams after Title IX was passed,77 but
with
the court held that Brown's expansion was not sufficient to comply
78
"activity."
recent
sufficient
been
not
had
there
Title IX because
What the court failed to look at is the fact that it is not economically
feasible, at least for most schools, to continually add sporting programs.
While data is difficult to find, at least one university's president has
stated that it costs, on the average, at least $350,000 to add a sports team
(exclusive of capital improvements). 79 An economic analysis at
Providence College found that it would cost more than three million
dollars to create enough women's athletic opportunities to rectify an 11
percent imbalance. 8 °
Virtually all women's sports programs lose money each year. 81 In
effect, women's sports become non-revenue sports because they do not
generate revenue in excess of operating costs. Division I non-revenue
sports, on average, cost $220,000 per year to operate in 1999-2000.82
Most schools cannot afford to add women's programs, especially when
the programs cannot support themselves, and therefore cannot meet
Prong 11.83 For many schools, the only way to add women's programs
76. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (June 4, 1975).
77. Cohen, 101 F.3d. at 163 ("[V]irtually all of the women's varsity teams [at
Brown] were created between 1971 and 1977, after Brown's merger with Pembroke
College. The only women's varsity team created after this period was winter track, in
1982.").
78. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 211 ("[Despite] an impressive history of program
expansion ... [Brown] has [not demonstrated that it] maintained a continuing practice of
intercollegiate expansion for women, the underrepresented sex.").
79. University of Iowa President Mary Sue Coleman, Speech, Achieving Equity in
Intercollegiate Athletics: A President's Perspective (May 12, 1998), available at
http://www.students.uwsp.edu/tstan630/links.htm (last visited June 22, 2002).
80. See Gavora, supra note 5, at 45.
81. The only profit-generating women's team I am aware of is the basketball
program at the University of Connecticut. See Gilbert M. Gaul & Frank Fitzpatrick,
Women 's Sports: The Ink Is Mostly Red, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 10, 2000, available at
(last
http://apse.dallasnews.com/contest/2000/writing/over250.enterprise.second2.html
visited Nov. 1, 2002).
82. See Gavora, supra note 5, at 157.
83. Id. at 38 (asserting that only three schools investigated by OCR during the
Clinton administration were found to be Title IX compliant under Prong I, and they were
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has been to cut existing men's programs and reallocate funds. Some just
cut men's programs.8 4 The Cohen court logically recognized that
"merely reducing program offerings to the overrepresented sex does not
constitute program 'expansion"' for the underrepresented gender,8 5 but
this recognition simply elevated Prong I. Clearly cutting men's
programs does not offer women more opportunities, so cutting men's
programs, standing alone, cannot satisfy Prong II; but cutting men's
programs does, however, decrease the number of men's athletic
opportunities. If a school cuts a sufficient number of men's programs
while keeping women's opportunities constant, it can reach substantial
proportionality and satisfy Prong I while still failing Prong 11.86
The obvious questions for Prong II are what constitutes a continuing
practice of expansion and when can expansion stop? The first question
may not be answered empirically, but the second answer is obvious; an
educational institution can quit expanding women's athletic opportunities
when substantial proportionality exists.87 A school can halt expansion
under Prong II when it satisfies Prong 1.88

Prong III: Where the members of one sex are under represented
among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a
continuing practice of program expansion such as that cited
only in compliance because "they were in the process of adding multiple women's
teams").
84. See
Michael
Lynch,
Title
IX's
Pyrrhic
Victory,
at
http://reason.com/0104/fe.mI.title.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2002) ("Most schools can't
fund expansions through massive fund-raising campaigns or use state granted tuition
waivers. For the great majority of schools, being safe from a Title IX investigation or
private lawsuit means cutting men's programs.").
85. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 211 (D.R.I. 1995).
86. To demonstrate, assume there is a university that has 50 percent male and 50
percent female enrollment. It currently has 22 total teams with 320 total athletes. Men
make up 185 of the athletes; 135 are women. While 50 percent of the enrolled students
are women, women have only 42 percent of the athletic opportunities. If the school cuts
teams totaling fifty men, while not increasing the number of women's opportunities,
substantial proportionality exists and the school is presumed to be in compliance with
Title IX under Prong 1.
87. See Gavora, supra note 5, at 36; see also Joshua Ryan Heller, Stepping Back To
Punt: FavoringInternalAgency Interpretationsover Title IX and its Regulations, 12 J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 179, 185 (2000) ("[A]lthough historical expansion requires a more detailed
examination of the institution than simply comparing the ratio of athletic opportunities
with the population of the educational institution, the intended result is the same as
substantial proportionality: substantial gender proportionality between the athletic
opportunities and the population of the institution.").
88. See Robert C. Farrell, Title IXor College Football?,32 Hous. L. REv. 993, 1044
(1995) ("[Prong II] was always a temporary device, effectively functioning as a stay for a
college that was out of compliance with Title IX but moving in the direction of
compliance.").
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above, whether it can be fully demonstrated that the interests and
abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and
effectively accommodated by the present program. 89
Prong III allows a school to comply with Title IX without achieving
substantial proportionality if the school fully and effectively
accommodates the interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex. 90
The Cohen court's interpretation of "fully and effectively" is impossible
to align with Title IX's intended purpose and limitations. Title IX
specifies that it shall not be interpreted to require any educational
institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment to the members of
one sex on account of any imbalance that may exist. 9' Cohen interpreted
Prong III to require absolute accommodation for women's programs,
assuming women are underrepresented.9 2 This standard creates exactly
the type of preferential treatment Title IX is supposed to prevent because
the underrepresented gender (women) must be fully accommodated,
while the overrepresented gender (men) is not.93 It is difficult to argue
that an interpretation requiring full accommodation for the minority,
while not offering the same measure of protection to the majority, is
something other than a form of affirmative action. The court insists that
it is not, but by elevating Prong I's substantial proportionality to
preeminent status, Title IX has clearly become a de facto quota system.94
In 1994, the United States District Court for the Central District of
89. Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, supra note 13, at 71,414.
90. Id.
91. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (West 1990).
(b) Preferential or disparate treatment because of imbalance in participation or
receipt of Federal benefits; statistical evidence of imbalance.
Nothing
contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpreted to require any
educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment to the
members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect
to the total number or percentage of persons of that sex participating in or
receiving the benefits of any federally supported program or activity, in
comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of that sex in any
community ....
Id.
92. Cohen, 101 F.3d. at 174 ("Under Cohen II's controlling interpretation, prong
three 'demands not merely some accommodation, but full and effective accommodation.
If there is sufficient interest and ability among members of the statistically
underrepresented gender, not slaked by existing programs, and the institution necessarily
fails this prong of the test."').
93. See Mark Hammond, Note, Substantial ProportionalityNot Required: Achieving
Title IX Compliance Without Reducing Participationin Collegiate Athletics, 87 KY. L.J.
793, 805-06 (1998) ("This interpretation of the 'full and effective accommodation'
requirement makes it identical to the 'substantial proportionality' requirement. Thus, the
Cohen court has effectively read prong three out of the effective accommodation test.").
94. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
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Illinois decided Kelley v. Board of Trustees.95 Kelley was the first
intercollegiate "reverse discrimination" case. In Kelley, male plaintiffs
alleged they were denied athletic opportunities due to their gender
because male athletic opportunities were cut in an attempt to reach
substantial proportionality. Despite Title IX's unequivocal language,96
the court held that cutting men's athletic opportunities in an attempt to
rectify an existing disparity did not violate Title IX, even though such
action clearly grants preferential treatment to female athletes and
to male athletes. 97 Courts have repeatedly followed
disparate treatment
98
this logic.
In 1996, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana decided Pederson v. Louisiana State University.99 As
previously discussed, the decision in Cohen limited the OCR's three
prong analysis to a single prong test focusing on substantial
proportionality.10 0 The Pederson court emphatically rejected reliance on
the substantial proportionality requirement10 1 and held that prior court
decisions were erroneous in that regard. 10 2 The court correctly
determined that the substantial proportionality requirement itself does not
come from Title IX, but from the OCR's Interpretation. 10 3 The court
reasoned that in order to either elevate substantial proportionality or
cease analysis after that prong, a court must assume that the interest and
ability to participate in sports is equal between men and women. 10 4 The

95. 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994).
96. Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, supra note 13, at 71,414.
97. Kelley is further evidence of the broad impact of Cohen on Title IX cases. While
the central issues are different, the Kelley court prominently cited Cohen as justification
for cutting men's teams, without adding women's opportunities, in pursuit of substantial
proportionality. Kelly, 35 F.3d at 268-72. The University could, however, eliminate the
men's swimming program without violating Title IX because even after eliminating the
program, men's participation in athletics would continue to be more than substantially
proportionate to their presence in the University's student body. As Cohen makes clear,
"if the percentage of student-athletes of a particular sex is substantially proportionate to
the percentage of students of that sex in the general student population, the athletic
interests of that sex is presumed to have been accomodated."
See id. at 270
98. See, e.g., Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1049 (8th Cir. 2002)
(finding that Title IX was not violated when men's wrestling cut); Boulahanis v. Bd. of
Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 641 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1284 (2000) (finding
that Title IX was not violated when men's soccer and men's wrestling were cut); Gonyo
v. Drake Univ., 879 F. Supp. 1000, 1006 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (finding that Title IX was not
violated when men's wrestling cut).
99. 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996).
100. See supra notes 58-94 and accompanying text.
101. Pederson,912 F. Supp. at 914.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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court noted it had not seen evidence in any prior cases supporting such
an assumption and recognized that making such an unsupported
assumption the cornerstone of Title IX compliance analysis may lead to
unjust results.' 0 5 To date,10 6the Pederson analysis has not been fully
adopted by any other court.
C. Responses by EducationalInstitutions
Logically, educational institutions should be running scared of Title
IX. The vast majority of schools are not Title IX compliant 10 7 and,
understandably, they do not want to jeopardize federal funds 10 8 or run the
risk of expensive lawsuits that tarnish their carefully cultivated (or
desired) images. This fear has lead many schools to cut men's
programs' 0 9 because they cannot afford to maintain those programs while
105. Id.
106. At least part of the Pederson analysis was adopted by the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of California, but the decision was reversed on appeal to the
9th Circuit. See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ., 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999).
107. There is some uncertainty regarding the percentage of schools actually in
compliance with Title IX, but it appears that less than 10 percent of schools comply. See,
e.g., Lynch, supra note 84 (citing Professor Mary Jo Kane who said that "[o]nly 9 percent
of Division I schools are in compliance").
108. I am not aware of a single instance where the federal government has terminated
funding to an educational institution for violating Title IX.
109. Virtually every source seems to agree that men's programs have been cut and
that men's athletic opportunities have diminished since the enactment of Title IX. See,
e.g., Tell, supra note 56 (finding that since 1993 more than fifty men's golf programs,
twenty-three men's swimming and diving programs, thirty-nine men's tennis programs,
ninety men's cross country and track and field programs, and forty-three wrestling
programs have been terminated, downgraded, or suspended, resulting in the loss of more
than twenty thousand men's varsity athletic opportunities); Frank J. Murray, Lawsuit
Wrestles with Title IX, WASH. TIMES, May 13, 2002, available at
www.washtimes.com/national/20020513-901817.htm (last visited July 2, 2002) (citing a
GAO report finding that approximately 2,350 men's teams have been abolished to allow
schools to comply with Title IX); see also Jonah Goldberg, The Trouble with Title IX,
WASH. TIMES, May 10, 2002, available at
www.washtimes.com/commentary/commentary-200251011115.htm (last visited July 2,
2002) (finding that men have lost over eighty thousand intercollegiate opportunities since
Title IX was passed).
The only dissenting voice belongs to Dr. Donna Lopiano. I will reference Dr.
Lopiano frequently in this Article because she is the Executive Director of the Women's
Sports Foundation ("WSF") and is often cited as one of the preeminent Title IX
proponents. See, e.g., Deidre G. Duncan, Gender Equity in Women's Athletics, 64 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1027, 1043-44 (1996). The WSF has produced a great deal of research on,
and articles about, various aspects of Title IX. Many of these pieces are available at the
organization's website, www.womenssportsfoundation.org.
I have been frequently
confused by arguments made by, or attributed to, Dr. Lopiano. As an example, Dr.
Lopiano seems to argue that men's athletic opportunities have actually increased during
the life of Title IX. See Murray, supra ("[Ms. Lopiano] said that 31 football teams and
149 men's soccer programs had been added to NCAA rosters."). But see U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 51, at 5 (finding that from Title IX's enactment to the
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adding women's.'1 Those institutions that have been willing or able to
create women's athletic opportunities have not necessarily created
opportunities that meet the interests of otherwise available female
participants."
The National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") is a
voluntary association of colleges, universities, athletic conferences, and
sports organizations.12 The NCAA establishes rules that govern its
association and national intercollegiate athletics programs." 13 The
NCAA appears to be equally despised by those both for and against Title
IX.

4

While initially hostile to Title IX, the NCAA eventually

recognized two things: first, that Title IX would not go away, so some
action was warranted; 115 and second, that most educational institutions
would need to add female sports to comply with Title IX. As a result of
these two revelations, the NCAA recommended that schools add
"emerging sports"' 1 6 to create women's athletic opportunities. The
NCAA's suggested sports were the team sports of crew, ice hockey,
handball, water polo, and synchronized swimming, and the individual
sports of archery, badminton, bowling, and squash. 1 7 This is not a
1997-98 school year "the number of men participating [in intercollegiate athletics]
decreased from about 248,000 to about 234,000"); Lynch, supra note 84, at 9 (citing a
separate interpretation of the same study and concluding that "from the 1985-86
academic year to the 1996-97 academic year, 21,000 male athletic spots disappeared").
110. See, e.g., George A. Davidson & Carla A. Kerr, Title IX: What Is Gender
Equity?, 2 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 25 (1995), availableat
http://vls.law.vi11.edu/students/orgs/sports/back -issues/volume2/issuel/titleix.htmI (last
visited Oct. 29, 2002) ("In this era of tight budgets, achieving a varsity participation ratio
that isproportionate to enrollment would require most institutions to eliminate men's
teams and to create women's teams."). Of course, as previously discussed, some schools
simply cut men's programs and do not add women's.
111. Legal counsel for educational institutions are also to blame, although they may
just be giving their best advice based on Cohen and its progeny. That advice is that the
only sure way to comply with Title IX is to achieve substantial proportionality. See, e.g.,
Gavora, supra note 5, at 45 (discussing the advice of counsel for Providence College
when asked how Providence could become Title IX complaint when they did not have
substantial proportionality). "Their advice was direct: the only way ...was somehow to
add enough female athletes, or subtract male athletes, to close the gap." Id. Of course,
Providence, like most schools, lacked the funds to simply add women's teams while
maintaining men's. Such additions would have totaled more than three million dollars.
Id.
112. See NCAA, at http://ncaa.org/about/what-is-the-ncaa.html (last visited Oct. 30,
2002).
113. See id
114. See Duncan, supra note 109, at 1052 ("The only point opponents and proponents
of Title IX can agree on is that the NCAA has not helped the problem at all.").
115. Id.at 1042.
116. NCAA GENDER EQUITY TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 5-6, available at
www.ncaa.org/gender equity/resource materials/table of contents.pdf (last visited Nov.
3,2002).
117. Id. at 6.
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situation where the NCAA was promoting sports of wide participation
but low public attention; this was clearly an attempt to manufacture
women's athletic opportunities and interests." 8 As an example, in 1994,
the year after the NCAA recommended that colleges add women's crew
programs, there were only thirty-six women's high school crew teams in
the United States.1 19 As the University of Massachusetts women's crew
coach explained, "The reason we're here is Title IX, everyone knows
it.' ' 120 Manufacturing opportunities has become so ridiculous that Ohio
State put an ad in the student newspaper begging for "Tall athletic
women wanted. No experience necessary" to fill its women's crew
squad. 12 ' Landlocked Arizona State University had to flood a two mile
gulch to create a place for its women's crew team to practice. 122 It gets
even more ludicrous. 123
In 1998, the University of ArkansasBirmingham ("UAB") added women's synchronized swimming to
balance out its move to Division I football. 124 At the time UAB added
synchronized swimming, the NCAA did not even sanction the sport and
only four other schools that competed
in Division I sports offered a
25
synchronized swimming program.'
Clearly, it is theoretically possible to reach substantial compliance

118. See Tell, supra note 56 ("The vast majority of major colleges already offer the
most popular women's sports, so to boost their varsity female totals, a fair number of
them, with the NCAA's connivance, have begun conferring full 'team' status on exotic
hobbies or outright trivia. New horseback riding and women's bowling 'programs' have
been the fashion for some time now.").
119. Gavora, supra note 5, at 66.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 67.
122. Id. But see Julia Lamber, Gender andIntercollegiateAthletics: Data and Myths,
34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 151, 210 (2001) (stating that Professor Lamber argues that, as
an empirical fact, "No school asserts that it has tried to expand the athletic opportunities
for women athletes but has been unable to find interested and skilled women athletes.");
see also Farrell, supra note 88, at 1049 ("Whenever well organized, well-funded, and
well-promoted athletic opportunities have been made available to women, women's
interests in athletics has flourished.").
123. See, e.g., John Rainey, All Things Do Not Have To Be TreatedEqually, MEMPHIS
Bus. J., May 31, 2002, availableat
http://memphis.bizjournals.com/memphis/stories/2002/06/03/editorials3.html (last visited
July 26, 2002) ("1 personally know of one female student on a golf team scholarship who
never played a single round of golf before she went to college."); see also Valerie M.
Bonnette, OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, DEP'T OF EDUC., TITLE IX ATHLETIC INVESTIGATOR'S
MANUAL 10 (1990) ("Title IX does not require institutions to offer athletic programs nor,
if any athletic program is offered, is there any requirement that the program be
particularly good ....").
124. See generally New Pool of Blazers: Title IX Prompts UAB To Add Synchronized
Swimming, CNN SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 4, 1998, available at
sportsillustrated.cnn.com/more/swimming/news/ 1998/07/04/uabsynch/index.html (last
visited July 2, 2002).
125. Id.
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under Title IX by maintaining men's athletic opportunities and adding
126
women's, but it just not economically feasible for most schools.
Instead, the vast majority of schools have cut men's programs, added
women's programs that are not satisfying expressed or defined
interests,127 or both. The inescapable fact remains that eliminating men's
programs, while maintaining the current level of women's programs,
only serves
to decrease overall participation and does not benefit either
8
12

group.

D. The Numeric Effects Attributed to Title IX
Title IX's direct effects on the world of intercollegiate athletics are
It is
subjectively obvious, but difficult to objectively establish.
undisputed that more women participate in intercollegiate athletics today
than in the past. It seems equally undisputed that women can achieve
great benefits from participation in athletics. 129 Countless authors and
commentators have asserted that Title IX is the cause of the increase in
female athletic participation. 130 Inevitably, these commentators point to
a number representing female participation in sports prior to the
126. See Jodi Schneider, The Fairness Factor, U.S.NEwS.COM, Mar. 18, 2002, at
www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/college/sports/articles/18equity.htm (last visited July 2,
2002) (quoting former UCLA men's swimming Coach Rona Ballatore who said: "You
don't have to drop programs [to comply with Title IX]. But it's the easier way out for the
schools. Then, you're done with it, you don't have to worry about men's sports anymore;
you can just add women's sports and make it work").
127. See infra Section lI.B.
128. See Hammond, supra note 93, at 794.
129. See Bauer, supra note 6, at 991-92 ("Studies show that women who have had the
opportunity to participate in athletics acquire a greater sense of confidence, self-esteem,
and pride. These studies have also shown that athletics foster personal skills and
relationships in addition to promoting physical and psychological health. Further, there is
a positive correlation between student participation in sports, a reduced probability of
teenage pregnancy and an increase in the likelihood of high school graduation."); see also
Duffy, supra note 7, at 80-82 ("[E]mpirical studies show that, in capitalist societies such
as ours, the sport experience is the primary socialization tool for teaching individuals how
to achieve.").
130. See, e.g., Hammond, supra note 93, at 796 ("The adoption of Title IX in 1972
had an immediate impact on women's athletic participation in terms of growth."); see
also Bauer, supra note 6, at 983 ("Within a decade of Title IX's enactment, the number
of girls participating in sports increased by 500%."); Rhonda Reaves, There's No Crying
in Baseball: Sports and the Legal and Social Construction of Gender, 4 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 283, 287 (2001) ("The passage and enforcement of Title IX has provided women
with unprecedented opportunities to participate in sports at all levels ....
");Megan K.
Starace, Reverse Discrimination Under Title IX. Do Men Have a Sporting Chance?, 8
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 189, 190 (2001) ("Within four years of [Title IX's]
implementation, the number of female athletes in the United States increased by 600
percent, to comprise over two million participants."); see Brake, supra note 7, at 15
("Since the enactment of Title IX, female participation in competitive sports has soared to
unprecedented heights.").
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enactment of Title IX, point to a number representing female
participation in sports after enactment, and assert that Title IX is the
cause of the increased numbers.
It is true that female athletic
participation has increased dramatically during the life of Title IX.
However, as I will next discuss, I have not seen any empirical proof that
Title IX is the direct cause of that increase.
From the fall of 1971, the year before Title IX was passed, to the
fall of 1997, the number of women enrolled in United States colleges and
universities more than doubled.' 13 By 1997, women represented 56
percent of undergraduates. 132 For the 1995-96 academic year, first year
male and female students received approximately equal amounts of
grants and aid. 133 For athletes, the amount of scholarship aid per female
now exceeds the amount, per male. 134 It does not appear that these
advances for female students
and athletes are directly and empirically
135
attributable to Title IX.
136
Social scientist Charles Murray developed the "Trendline Test."'
The Trendline Test looks at the rate of an activity both before and after a
particular law is passed to help determine what effect, if any, the law has
had on an activity. 137 In the case of Title IX, the Trendline Test would
examine female participation in intercollegiate sports both before and
after enactment of Title IX. While it is certainly true that the number of
women participating in intercollegiate athletics has risen dramatically
during Title IX's life, the rate of growth has actually slowed since
inception of the Act.
From 1966-1971, the number of women
participating in intercollegiate sports doubled. 138 From 1971-72, the
number of girls playing high school sports jumped from one in twentyseven to one in nine. 139 Title IX was enacted in 1972, but was not widely
131. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 51, at 10 (finding that female
enrollees increased from 3.7 to 8.2 million).
132. Id.
133. Id.at 14.
134. Id. at 16.
135. It does appear, at least subjectively, that Title IX had a significant effect on
changes for female athletic and educational opportunities. Id.at 20.
We found widespread agreement among those we interviewed that Title IX has
increased women's participation in both academics and intercollegiate athletics
even though the law's effect cannot be isolated from the effects of other legal
and social changes that have aimed at gender equity. There is also widespread
agreement that enforcement efforts led by [the Department of ] Education's
OCR have played a role in Title IX's effect on women's increasing
participation in higher education programs.
Id.
136. See Goldberg, supra note 109.
137. Id.
138. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supranote 51, at 6.
139. Id.
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enforced during the 1970s; 140 yet girls' participation in high school sports
time. 14 1
increased again from one in nine to one in four during that
has only increased 50 percent in the two decades since the
Participation
142
1970s.

Additionally, there does not appear to be a reliable method of
separating Title IX's effects from the effects of other events and
activities. 143 It may certainly be that societal developments other than
Title IX caused equivalent or greater changes to women's pursuit of
intercollegiate athletics.144 The increase in women's demand for athletic
opportunities may simply be a result of more women enrolling in
145
while their interests in athletics
institutions of higher education,
146
constant.
relatively
remained
Without question, a great number of men's athletic opportunities
have been cut during the life of Title IX. 14 7 Again many commentators
140. See, e.g., Lamber, supra note 122, at 152 ("For several reasons the regulation,
referred to as the Title IX regulation, did not really have an effect on intercollegiate
athletics for more than fifteen years."); see also Christine Stolba, Introductory Remarks
to Talk by Jessica Gavora, Tilting the Playing Field: Schools, Sports, Sex, and Title IX
(Sept. 2002), available at www.iwforg/pubs/exfemina/September2002d.shtml (last
visited Nov. 4, 2002) ("[I]n the late 70s and early 80s, most feminists were not thinking
about Title IX. They were preoccupied with passing the Equal Rights Amendment.").
141. See Goldberg, supra note 109.
142. Id.
143. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 51, at 23 ("According to the
research we contracted, there is no reliable method for separating Title IX's effects from
the effect of other factors.").
144. Id. at 21 (identifying other causes of social change such as the 1963 Equal Pay
Act and changes in federal student financial aid policies that gave more middle class
students (men and women) more opportunities to attend college).
145. Id. (finding that the percentage of female as undergraduates increased from less
than 25 percent to 43 percent prior to passage of Title IX).
146. See infra text accompanying note 279.
147. See generally Kathryn Jean Lopez, Benched at Bowling Green (May 10, 2002),
at www.nationalreview.com/lopez/lopez/051002.asp (last visited July 5, 2002) (citing the
loss of men's baseball and wrestling at Howard University, men's track at the University
of Vermont, men's track at Tulane University, and men's track, tennis, swimming, and
diving at Bowling Green State University); Stolba, supra note 140, at 1-2 (citing the loss
of men's baseball and swimming at Iowa State University, men's swimming and diving
at the University of Nebraska, men's wrestling at Seton Hall University, Capital
University, and the University of St. Thomas, and men's golf at Eastern Washington
University and Portland State University); Lynch, supra note 84 (citing the loss of:
wrestling at Bucknell University; baseball, men's golf, and men's tennis at Providence
College; men's wrestling, men's soccer, and men's tennis at Miami University of Ohio;
men's wrestling, gymnastics, and swimming at the University of New Mexico; men's
wrestling and gymnastics at Brigham Young University; and men's crew, swimming, and
diving at the University of Miami (Fla.)); Murray, supra note 109 (citing Yale's loss of
varsity wrestling); Schneider, supra note 126 (citing the loss of men's wrestling at
Marquette University). The termination of Marquette's men's wrestling program
demonstrates another issue created by the interpretation and application of Title IX.
Substantial proportionality focuses on the number of athletic opportunities offered,
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would point to a number representing men's athletic opportunities prior
to Title IX's inception, point to a number existing at some point after
inception, and argue that Title IX has been responsible for the reduction
in men's athletic opportunities. 48 There is a fundamental problem with
this contention. Many men's programs were cut after Title IX was
enacted, but before it was widely enforced. 49 As an example, Title IX
was not widely enforced from 1984-88,150 yet as many as eighty-five
men's wrestling teams were dropped during that time.151 Only thirty-two
regardless of the source of the funding for those opportunities. The Marquette wrestling
program was almost entirely donor funded through the Marquette Wrestling Club. Id.
On a related note, female athletes may view the cuts in men's programs as
unfair. See Lynch, supra note 84 (stating that the day after Providence cut men's
programs, "[Providence] swimmer Michelle Hackmer told The New York Times[,] 'When
the announcement was made about eliminating baseball, the women athletes were as mad
about it as anyone else ....Sure we want women athletes to be treated fairly, but at this
expense? I don't think this is what Title IX was supposed to be about."').
148. See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 7, at 68 ("[B]oys' athletic participation in high
school has dropped from 3,666,917 participants in 1971 to 3,536,359 participants in
1995 ....
");Goldberg, supra note 109.
149. Lamber, supra note 122, at 152.
150. See Welch Suggs, Foes of Title IX Try To Make Equity in College Sports a
Campaign Issue (Feb. 4, 2000), at www.iaq2000.org/0323001.htm (last visited Oct. 23,
2002); see also Stolba, supra note 140, at 2 (discussing feminist use of Title IX) ("They
set about to turn Title IX into what the New York Times called 'a far reaching remedial
tool for women.' They didn't get very far in the 1980s, needless to say.").
151. See Suggs, supra note 150. The actual number of teams cut during that time is in
dispute. See William Weathers, Former Coaches: Title IX Didn 't Ax Men's Sports, THE
ADVOCATE, Oct. 23, 2002, available at
www.theadvocate.om/stories/071402/spo_title001.shtml (last visited Oct. 23, 2002)
("From 1984-88[,] 53 wrestling teams across the country were dropped."). I do not know
which number, if either, is correct. I have seen one other source citing the loss of fiftythree programs. The National Women's Law Center ("NWLC") has provided data on the
termination of men's wrestling programs. See National Women's Law Center, Title IX
and Minor Sports: A False Conflict, at 3-4, at
http://www.nwlc.org/details.cfm?id=1095&section=education (last visited Nov. 3, 2002).
I am skeptical of the data and interpretation provided by the NWLC in various
publications. I think it is important to itemize some of the discrepancies, or at least
interpretations, I have observed in its articles and bulletins so that readers may evaluate
the NWLC's credibility for themselves.
The NWLC claims that forty-six of the eighty institutions investigated by the
OCR since 1992 have complied with Title IX under Prongs II or III of the three prong
test. Id. at 7. 1 have never heard any other author argue that more than one institution
has been found in compliance under Prong Ii. See infra note 251. Only one other author
found as many as three in compliance under Prong II. See infra note 228.
The NWLC claims that the number of male athletes has increased from 170,384
(when Title IX was adopted) to 208,866 in 2001. See National Women's Law Center,
Quick Facts on Title IX, at http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/QuickFactsOnTitlelX.pdf (last
visited Nov. 3, 2002). But see Erik Lords, More Women and Fewer Men Participatein
IntercollegiateAthletics, Study Finds, 1 (July 9, 1999), at
www.ncaa.org/gender-equity/resource-materials/AdditionalMaterials/1999_GAOStudy
.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2002). "The total number of male undergraduates fell 12
percent, from 185,040 to 163,363. The number of men's teams fell by 3 percent." Id.
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wrestling programs were dropped between 1989 and 1998,152 when Title
IX was more widely enforced. 53 At least one wrestling coach whose
team was cut in the 1980s was clear that the cut was not due to Title IX,
15 4
but was a result of low popularity and lack of conference tie in.
Further, in many cases, the termination of men's athletic programs
appears to55be a result of financial constraints or management rather than
Title IX. 1
It is not possible to empirically establish the effects of Title IX on
male and female intercollegiate athletic opportunities. Conversely, it
seems ridiculous to argue Title IX has had little or no effect simply
because that effect cannot be quantified. Perhaps it is accurate to
summarize by borrowing from another author seemingly troubled by the
same dichotomy: "Title IX is a regime which has, directly and
indirectly, often by fits and starts, and without ever being a model of
theoretical elegance or coherence, helped bring about a world in which
more and more women and girls share in a set of valuable experiences
that were almost the exclusive province of men and boys three decades
ago."

II.

156

157
Recommendations for Title IX's Future Interpretation and Use

If we assume that Title IX will continue to be construed to promote
"The ceiling on the number of scholarships that each Division I college is allowed to
award decreased by 11 percent for men, from 342 to 306." Id.
The NWLC maintains that "72 percent of those colleges or universities that
added women's teams did so without cutting any men's teams." See National Women's
Law Center, Quick Facts on Title IX, Common Dreams ProgressiveNewswire (May 28,
2002), at http://www.commondreams.org/news2002/0528-03.htm (last visited Nov. 5,
2002). If true, this fact is certainly misleading as it does not account for schools that have
simply dropped men's programs without adding women's.
152. Suggs, supra note 150.
153. Id.
154. See Weathers, supra note 151.
155. See Hammond, supra note 93, at 794 ("A look at the budgets of athletic
departments across the nation shows a systematic mismanagement of funds, resulting in
many schools lacking the revenue needed to create and fund new and existing sports.");
see also Lamber, supra note 122, at 162 ("[E]xpansion of athletic opportunities is not the
cause of reduced athletic opportunities for men. Uneven distribution of male athletic
opportunities is the cause.").
156. Sherman J. Clark, Title IX, Gender Equity, and Athletics: Introduction to the
Mixed Messages of Title IX, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 1 (2000).
157. As previously discussed, the Bush Panel has voted on which of its own
recommendations it will forward to the Secretary of Education. At the time of drafting
this Article, the recommendations have not been released to the public. Some sources
have obtained at least some of the recommendations in draft form. See Gary Abbott, The
Commission on Opportunity in Athletics Votes To Keep Proportionality,but Passes Many
Revisions to its Measurement, at www.themat.com/pressbox/pressdetail.asp?aid=6649
(last visited Feb. 13, 2003).
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equal athletic opportunities for female athletes, we must properly define
"equal" and "athletic opportunities" so that we can carry out the intent of
Title IX and meet the true interests of female athletes. 158 If we further
assume that the OCR will continue to have authority to interpret and
enforce Title IX, we must hold that agency to the objective standards it
or Congress has set forth.' 59 I submit that both of these assumptions are
valid because no reasonable, or at least savvy, legislator would want to
be perceived as "against Title IX." As one author put it: "[A]ny member
of congress wishing to legislatively alter current [Title IX] enforcement
mechanisms risks political death by being labeled sexist."' 60 In light of
6
these assumptions, I offer three recommendations for the Bush Panel.' '
First, define "equal" in "equal athletic opportunities" to allow a host
institution the option to exempt individual profit-generating sports
Second, define
programs from Title IX compliance calculations.
"athletic opportunities" to include activities that fit a pragmatic definition
of sport and that would pass objective application of the OCR's

158. 1 am assuming that Title IX will remain in effect, and probably without
amendment, because legislators fear being viewed as somehow "against women's
athletics" if they are taking action that is perceived as "against Title IX." A recent
newspaper article cited research finding that "70% of adults who are familiar with Title
IX think the law should either be left as it is or strengthened." Christine Brennan, An
Executive Plea To Keep Title IX, USA TODAY, Jan. 29, 2003, at 3C. Of course the devil
is always in the details, perhaps nowhere more so that in the Title IX debate. I am
unclear what "familiar with Title IX" means in that article, but I suspect it might mean
having bias toward Title IX. The article goes on to cite a survey that may (or may not)
more accurately reflect lay impressions of Title IX: "[A] Wall Street Journal/NBC poll
reported that 66% [of respondents were] in favor of equality for women's programs, even
if it means cutting men's programs." Id.
My assumption that Title IX will remain intact may be incorrect. There were
four "town hall" meetings scheduled to gather input and opinions about the past use of
Title IX. At the first meeting, the percentage of participants seeking to leave Title IX
intact was only slightly greater than the percentage of participants seeking to change it.
See Larry Copeland, Title IX Meeting Brings Out Emotion, USA TODAY, Aug. 28, 2002,
at 6C.
159. It appears that the Bush panel would continue to have the OCR in charge of
interpreting and enforcing Title IX, and that it would have the OCR use the mechanisms
it has traditionally used to carry out those functions. See Erik Brady, Tempers Flare
Among Commission Members, USA TODAY, Jan. 30, 2003, at 3C:
Among recommendations passed [by the Bush panel on the previous day]:
-Any new policy interpretations that might arise from commission
recommendations should be developed through the federal rulemaking
procedures.
-OCR should aggressively enforce Title IX and implement sanctions, though
it should explore ways to urge compliance without threat of sanctions.
Id.
160. Ross A. Jurewitz, Playing at Even Strength: Reforming Title IX Enforcement in
IntercollegiateAthletics, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 283, 340-41 (2000).
161. These recommendations may be adopted individually or collectively. Either will
help to return Title IX to its true purpose regarding intercollegiate athletics.
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standards. Third, return all three prongs of the OCR's final Policy
Interpretation to equal status and interpret those prongs in a manner
consistent with the intent and plain language of Title IX.
A.

Define "Equal" in EqualAthletic Opportunity To Exempt Individual
Profit-GeneratingSports Programs

Title IX has been amended and interpreted to require equal athletic
opportunities. 162 Athletic opportunities require resources. Resources
require financial contribution. It is difficult to accept that all athletic
opportunities are equal, when not all athletic opportunities make equal
financial and other contributions to their schools. However, it seems that
"equal athletic opportunities" are only examined from the perspective of
what those activities offer participants or would-be participants. I submit
that a determination of "equal athletic opportunity" should also consider
what the activities offer to host institutions because, if there is no host
institution, there is no athletic opportunity. I further submit that the
individual Division I intercollegiate sports programs that generate profits
should be exempted from Title IX requirements, at the discretion of the
host institution, because profit-generating sports programs are not merely
opportunities for students to participate in athletics.
The Javits Amendment specifically directed the OCR to consider
the unique characteristics of all sports, 163 and the economic function of
profit-generating sports is a unique characteristic. Profit-generating
sports programs are not simply about dedicated athletes competing in
front of fellow students in the cozy confines of idyllic fields on crisp
autumn days. They are the straw that stirs the drink. They are television
contracts and football bowl games and popular events in American
culture. 64 Profit-generating sports provide benefits to the university, to
the revenue producing sport, and to other sports programs.1 65 Profitgenerating sports do not demand the same things as nonprofit-generating
sports, they do not make the same contributions, and they should not be
treated the same. 166 I submit that profit-generating sports should be
162. See supra text accompanying note 33.
163. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
164. See Gary Mihoces, Football Is King Now More than Ever, USA TODAY, Aug.
30,
2002,
available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/2002-08-30acover x.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (finding that the most watched athletic
championship events were the Super Bowl, the NCAA football championship game, and
the NCAA men's basketball championship tournament).
165. Jurewitz, supra note 160, at 339.
166. See Hon. Donald E. Shelton, Equally Bad Is Not Good: Allowing Title IX
"Compliance" by the Eliminationof Men's Collegiate Sports, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
253, 262 (2000) (relating an anecdote that is as entertaining and insightful as it is
succinct: "As the former NCAA Executive Director Richard Schultz once told a
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exempted from Title IX compliance requirements. 167
Schools that field dominant teams, especially in higher profile
sports, are likely to receive profits from these programs because of the
money that the teams can generate. Profits obviously come from
participation in games and tournaments, 68 but also through lucrative
actvities such as selling advertising space in arenas,169 merchandise
sales, 170 and through outside apparel contracts. 171 Having said that, it is
gathering of collegiate governing board members where I was present, 'Look as the
newspaper Sunday morning-how did your Chemistry department do Saturday?').
167. Others have put forth different proposals to exempt revenue-producing sports
from Title IX compliance requirements. See supra note 26 (discussing the "Tower
Amendment"); H.R. 8394, 82nd Cong. (1975) (proposing to apply revenues from a sport
to that sport only); S. 2106, 85th Cong. (1977) (completely exempting revenue producing
sports from Title IX). It is unclear exactly why these amendments failed, but it may have
been because of the view that some sports (most likely football and men's basketball)
were being treated as more important than others due to their potential profit production,
regardless of whether or not individual programs were actually profitable. What I am
proposing is different.
While the specific discussion of implementation is a topic for a different article, I
propose that an individual athletic activity that demonstrates a profit over a specific
period of time may be exempted from Title IX requirements if the host school chooses to
do so and that the program remains eligible for exemption as long as it remains
profitable. I am not proposing that an entire sport (i.e., football) be exempted because I
am certainly not convinced that all football programs generate a profit. I am not
proposing that revenue-generating sports be exempted because it is possible to generate
revenues without actually generating a profit, especially over a period of time. If,
however, an athletic activity demonstrates a profit for X number of years straight, or over
a period of Y years, the program should be treated differently than nonprofit-producing
sports because it is contributing to the school and athletic department in ways different
from nonprofit-producing sports.
168. See Athletes Should Have Different Requirements for College Admissions, at
(last visited
http://sun.menloschool.org-sportsman/ethics/project/topics/tyler/pro.html
Jan. 21, 2003).
The major conferences have an eight year package (ending in 2006) worth
$930,000,000 with A.B.C. to televise [the] Bowl Championship Series at
the conclusion of the regular football season. Each team playing in a B.C.S.
game currently receives about $13,000,000, and, under the terms of the new
contract, will receive around $17,000,000 in the final years of the contract.
Since the teams share these monies with their conference members, the 62
schools involved will divide approximately $116,000,000 in payout annually.
The NCAA has signed a $6,200,000,000, 11 year deal giving C.B.S. the rights
to televise its men's basketball championship [tournament] .... [T]hat's

$545,000,000 a year ....
Id.
169. As an example, the University of Colorado has more than fifty different
corporate sponsors. One of those sponsors is the Coors Brewing Company. Coors pays
the University approximately three hundred thousand dollars per year. Id.
170. It is estimated that 2.5 billion dollars worth of college merchandise is sold
annually. Id. A school such as the University of Michigan can earn more than six
million dollars annually from merchandise sales. Id.
171. It is not uncommon for a high profile collegiate athletic team to have a shoe or
apparel contract worth more than one million dollars annually. Id.
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frustrating to try to determine actual revenues or profits from
intercollegiate sports. I attribute a large part of the huge disparity in
available numbers to the bias and passion fueling the Title IX debate.
The frequent and extensive examples of numeric manipulation regarding
football is just the tip of the iceberg, but it provides a valid example.
Depending on who you believe, and to what extent you believe them, 59
percent 72 to 80 percent 173 of Division I football programs lose money
75
every year, 174 but 60 percent turned a profit in 1999-2000.1
172. Albert Kim & Kostya Kennedy, The Games Women Play, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
June 24, 2002, at 21 ("[O]nly 41% of football teams and 51% of basketball teams
managed to break even."). On a side note, this article contains a great Title IX one-liner;
in response to George Will's commentary that women are not interested in sports, it was
said: "And we love athletic men. (Believe me, we want large numbers of athletic men
around a hell of a lot more than George Will does)." Id.
173. See Duffy, supra note 7, at 113-14 ("Although college football teams generate
money, they do not produce revenue. Eighty percent of all college football teams lose
money because of the expense of operating the programs."). But see Duncan, supra note
109, at 1048-49 ("[M]oney raised from college football, along with the revenue earned
from the NCAA Division I men's basketball tournament, assists in supporting several
other non revenue generating sports, men's and women's.").
Some commentators seem unintentionally ambiguous on this topic. See, e.g.,
Farrell, supra note 88, at 1029. "[Tlhose [college football] programs that make money
do not use those profits to fund women's sports in any substantial way." Id. "Football
profits arguably allowed 57 Division I-A schools to spend about $700,000 more for
women's sports than, on the average, they would have spent without any profits." Id. at
1030. It seems hard to argue that an additional $700,000 is not a substantial funding
increase for women's programs when the total average annual costs of women's
programs is $2,623,000.
Other authors seem intentionally ambiguous, if not out right manipulative. See.
e.g., Donna Lopiano, Women's Sports Foundation, Title IX Turns 30, at 2 (June 25,
2002), availableat
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/community/DailyNews/chattitleX020625.html
(last
visited Nov. 4, 2002) ("Eighty percent of all football teams lose money; they do not pay
for themselves."). Dr. Lopiano has also been quoted as saying "that women's athletic
opportunities are being denied 'while the football team is laughing all the way to the
bank."' See Murray, supra note 109.
174. See Robert Briggs, Softening Up Title IX, at
http:??wwwfac.cord.edu/pe/41000/00000023.htm (last visited July 2, 2002) ("Among
the supposedly lucrative big-time football programs in Division I-A, 45% are running
deficit programs averaging $650,000 losses annually.").
175. See NCAA, Fact Sheet, at www.ncaa.org/about/fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Nov.
4, 2002) (identifying that "Percent showing football profit in Division I-A-64%").
Calculations and interpretations are further muddied when schools receive shares
of proceeds based on fellow conference members' participation in such things as college
football bowl games. As an example, Northwestern University's 2002-03 football team
finished
with
a record
of three
wins
and
nine
losses.
See
www.bigten.org/fbo/fbc/index.cfm (last visited Dec. 30, 2002). The team was not invited
to participate in a bowl game, but two fellow Big Ten conference members, the
University of Iowa and Ohio State University, played in two different Bowl
Championship Series bowl games. Those games paid a total of 21.2 million dollars.
That money was then divided among all teams in the Big Ten conference. The end result
was that Northwestern received approximately 1.93 million dollars despite failing to
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The NCAA issued a Gender Equity Report for the year 19992000.176 It may be irresponsible to assume the NCAA does not have
some sort of agenda when developing and disseminating this report, but
it would seem to be one of the more reliable sources for intercollegiate
gender sports statistics. According to the NCAA, the average number of
male athletic participants in 1999-2000 Division I athletics was 233.3,
compared to 162.6 female participants. 177 On average, 116.8 of those
233.3 male participants played football, and 15.7 played basketball. 178 If
the participants in those two sports were removed, there would actually
be more women (162.6) than men (100.8) participating in sports. 179 The
logical question is: Why wouldn't we count profit-generating men's
basketball and football programs for Title IX purposes? Because, for
some schools, the revenues from those programs may allow nonprofitgenerating sports, including almost all women's sports, to exist.
According to the NCAA, in 1999-2000, a men's football program
cost, on the average, $2,480,000 and generated an average revenue of
$3,767,000,180 for a simple gross profit of $1,277,000. Men's basketball
cost an average of $1,084,000 and generated average revenues of
$1,601,000,181 for a simple gross profit of $517,000.

The total simple

gross profit generated, on average, by football and men's basketball is
$1,794,000. On the other hand, women's sports, in total, generate
$978,000 in revenues and cost $2,623,000 per year to operate, leaving an
annual simple gross deficit of $1,685,000.182 The end result is that
Division I schools, on average, generate total revenues of $11,252,000
from athletics and spend $11,327,000.183 Average profits generated from
men's football and basketball exceeds average annual losses from all
women's sports. These profits can be used to wholly or largely support
the existence of programs unable to support themselves. It seems not
inconsequential that the schools with the most profitable men's football
184
programs field the largest and most diverse women's sports programs.
Of course, in addition to supporting nonprofit-producing sports, profits
achieve a winning record. See generally, Brian Hamilton, Doing a Bowl on a Budget, ST.
PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Dec. 18, 2002, at D4.
176.

NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N,

1999-00

GENDER EQUITY REPORT

(Apr.

2002).
177. Id. at 12.
178. Id. at 24.
179. This difference may exist at some schools, but it is doubtful the difference would
exist at all schools because it exists only when both men's football and basketball
programs are profit generating.
180. Id. at 19.
181. Id.

182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See generally Lamber, supra note 122.
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85
can be used to benefit the school as a whole as well.1
In addition to profits, the success of an athletic program can
generate a variety of other benefits. A good example of what prominent
athletic success can do for a school occurred at Gonzaga University in
Spokane, Washington. Gonzaga is a private Jesuit university. In 19992000, its men's basketball team achieved a great deal of success in the
NCAA Men's Basketball Championship tournament. That success, and
attendant visibility, continued though the 2000-01 and 2001-02
tournaments. During this same time, applications to Gonzaga jumped 63
percent, enrollment increased by 17 percent, and donations increased
from $9.7 million to $16.5
million, though all other quantifiable
186
variables remained constant.
I readily admit that the contention that athletic success benefits
schools through higher applications or candidates with greater
qualification has been frequently discussed and debated.1 87 A recent
study found that more than 70 percent of college students are "not at all
influenced by the accomplishments of their school's athletic
programs"' 88 and at least one poll was interpreted as finding that "most
high school students rank the quality of a college's sports teams far down
89
the list of what they consider when deciding where to apply."',
However, those conclusions may miss the point. It may be the case that
athletic success creates attention and media exposure for a school and, as
a result of that increased exposure, prospective students are more aware
of a school's existence and potential ability to meet their interests and
needs. As Michael Graham, Xavier University's Vice President of
University Relations, pragmatially put it, "When a prospective student
receives a letter from you, you have five seconds in which he or she
decides to open that letter or pitch it. And whether that student opens the
letter.., depends upon what they know of you. So does the basketball
team win students? Well, no. Does it help to get that letter opened? Oh
yeah."' 190 While students may not make their final enrollment decision

185. See, e.g., University's GeneralFund Will Get the $2 Increase in Ticket Prices, at
http://espn.go.com/ncf/news/2003/0210/1506968.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2003)
(discussing a decision by the University of Oklahoma to increase football ticket prices by
two dollars each and to use the projected additional revenues of approximately one
million dollars to reduce a current deficit in the school's operating budget).
186. Tourney Run Helps SIU Reputation (Mar. 27, 2002), at
www.beloitdailynews.com/302/salu27.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
187. See, e.g., ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS (1999).
188. Brody Greenwald, "FlutieFactor" Still up for Debate, at
www.uwire.com/content/topsports032 101001 .html (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
189. Mary Beth Marklein, Colleges' Sports Success Is Not a Major Draw, USA
TODAY,
Mar. 3, 2001, available at www.usatoday.com/life/2001-03-20-collegesports.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
190. Mike Dodd, Winning One for the Admissions Office, USA Today, July 11, 1997,
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based on a school's athletic accompishments, they may develop an initial
interest in that school because of awareness created by that school's
success on a particular playing field.' 9'
I suspect that some critics of this recommendation may argue that
exempting profit-generating sports programs is discriminatory and that
"discrimination should not become acceptable just because it is
profitable."' 92 As I will next discuss, a difference in the number of male
and female athletic opportunities offered by an educational institution is
not discrimination if that difference is a result of a genuine difference in
interests. 193
at IA.
191. There are many examples similar to the previously discussed Gonzaga
University. In 1987, applications to Duke University rose 19 percent following Duke's
appearance in the Men's Basketball Championship Final Four. In 1996, Northwestern
University had to print more applications and install more phone lines in its admissions
office after its football team played in the Rose Bowl. See Mike Allen, UConn Finds
Rich Off-Court Gains in Basketball Power (Mar. 31, 1999), at http://pages.nyu.edu/fmhl/classes/innovations_inhigher ed/uconn.HTM (last visited Jan. 21, 2003). The
University of Connecticut attributes enormous changes to the successes of its men's and
women's basketball teams; donations were projected to increase by more than 400
percent, campus tours increased from nine thousand in 1998 to twelve thousand in 1999,
and the number of applications increased by 14 percent from 1998 to 1999. "I'd love to
say that every legislator and citizen in Connecticut was transfixed when [the University
of Connecticut] recruited a top physics professor from Iowa, but that just isn't the real
world. It was the athletics that got people to think again about UConn in a big way." Id.
Kansas State University, a long time football loser, has turned its football program
around and recognized attendant benefits to the student body. See Nancy Foster,
K-State's
Image,
at
Football's
Victories
Boost
www.kstatecollegian.com/issues/V 105/fa/nO33/news/cam.football.html (last visited Jan.
21, 2003) ("We have seen an increase in the number of out-of-state applications in the
last three years," [said Dean of Student Life Pat Bosco,] "And we believe this is due to
the positive exposure from the football program.").
192. See Farrell, supra note 88, at 1034. While it is beyond the scope of this paper,
Professor Farrell also raises a number of very good implementation questions that would
have to be answered before a functional definition of "profit-generating sport" could be
implemented. See id. at 1034-35.
193. Some might also argue that exempting profit-generating programs may create a
situation where the number of women's athletic opportunities outnumbers the number of
men's. That would allow a school to cut then existing women's opportunities to pursue
substantial proportionality with the existing (non-exempted) men's, resulting in a
decrease in women's athletic opportunities. This reduction should not happen if, as I
propose in Subsection C, the three prongs of the OCR's final Policy Interpretation are
treated equally and used to carry out the language and intent of Title IX and its
interpretations. The OCR's final Policy Interpretation requires:
6. Overall Determination of Compliance
The Department will base compliance determination under 86.41(c) of the
regulation (the "Effective Accommodation of Student Interests and Abilities"
component) upon a determination of the following:
a. Whether the policies of an institution are discriminatory in language or
effect; or
b. Whether disparities of a substantial and unjustified nature in the benefits,
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Redefine "Athletic Opportunity" Under Title IX and Provide the
Athletic Opportunities Warrantedby Objective Analysis

The OCR is in charge of defining and determining what constitutes
an athletic opportunity for purposes of Title IX. The analysis they have
developed seems innocuous and comprehensive on its face, but it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that the OCR has supplanted its own
objective requirements with subjective goals or beliefs, resulting in the
creation of athletic opportunities that are not desired by female athletes,
not commensurate with the OCR's stated criteria, and that exclude
opportunities that are desired by female athletes. The OCR evaluates
whether an activity is a sport on a case by case basis and must review the
following:
1. Whether selection for the team is based upon objective
factors related primarily to athletic ability;
2. Whether the activity is limited to a defined season;
3. Whether the team prepares for and engages in competition
in the same way as other teams in the athletic program with
respect to coaching, recruitment, budget, tryouts and
eligibility, and length and number of practice sessions and
competitive opportunities;
4. Whether the activity is administered by the athletic
department; and
5. Whether the primary purpose of the athletic activity is
athletic competition
and not the support or promotion of
94
other athletes. 1

treatment, services, or opportunities afforded male and female athletes exist in
the institution's program as a whole; or
c. Whether disparities in individual segments of the program with respect to
benefits, treatment, services, or opportunities are substantial enough in and of
themselves to deny equality of athletic opportunity.
See Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, supra note 13, at 71,419.
If the three prongs are treated in the manner I propose, Prong IlI will require a
school to fully 'and effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of student athletes.
If a group is alleging that their interests and abilities are not being met, even though
substantial proportionality exists, the courts should turn to the above criteria analyzing
overall compliance. Applying these criteria, a school would likely fail requirements b
and c and would not be Title IX compliant.
194. Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O'Shea, National Coordinator of Title IX
Athletics, Office of Civil Rights, to Mr. David Stead, Executive Director, Minnesota
State High School League (Apr. 11, 2000), available at
http://www.ed.gov/print/about/offices/list/ocr/stead.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2002). The
OCR may also choose to review "other evidence relevant to the activity," such as:
1. Whether organizations knowledgeable about the activity agree that it should be
recognized as a sport;
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I submit that the OCR should objectively apply the above analysis
and that it should do so in light of a common sense definition of "sport"
because, at the risk of being simplistic, sports are athletic
opportunities.195 Traditionally, "sport" has been defined as: "An activity
involving physical exertion and skill that is governed by a set of rules or
customs and often undertaken competitively."' 96 Under its current
interpretation of the above analysis, the OCR does not simply require
equal athletic opportunities that constitute sport, it requires athletic
opportunity even when interest or ability does not exist and, as I will
discuss, only when it subjectively "approves" of such an activity.
While the OCR has recognized a variety of activities as athletic
opportunities despite a general lack of participant or public interest,' 97 it
has refused to recognize competitive cheerleading as an athletic
opportunity.' 98 The OCR's refusal has a two fold effect. First, it
removes an activity that could allow educational institutions to reach
substantial proportionality. Second, the OCR's refusal to recognize
competitive cheerleading deprives female athletes of an opportunity they
clearly want.
To paraphrase one author, competitive cheerleading is not your

2. Whether the activity is recognized as part of the interscholastic or intercollegiate
athletic program by the athletic conference to which the institution belongs and
by organized state and national interscholastic or intercollegiate athletic
associations;
3. Whether stats, national, and conference championships exist for the activity;
4. Whether state, national, or conference rule book or manual has been adopted for
the activity;
5. Whether there is a state, national, or conference regulation of competition
officials along with standardized criteria upon which the competition may be
judged; and
6. Whether participants in the activity/sport are eligible to receive scholarships and
athletic awards (e.g., varsity awards).
Id.
195. While it is beyond the scope of this Article, it may well be the fact that OCR is
substituting subjective evaluation for objective evaluation in a variety of areas, with
predictable results. See Sudha Setty, Leveling the Playing Field: Reforming the Office
for Civil Rights To Achieve Title IX Enforcement, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBs. 331,
340-341 (1999) (reporting that "[i]n one case, the Atlanta regional office of OCR
assessed no violation of the substantial proportionality test despite a twenty-eight percent
disparity between female student enrollment and female athletic participation. Yet, in a
different case, the Boston Regional office found violations in two situations in which
only a six percent disparity was found").
196. See www.dictionary.com
197. See supra text accompanying notes 116-25.
198. The OCR does not make any distinction between types of cheerleading. It
simply classifies "cheerleading" as a "support organization." See Bonnette, supra note
123, at 15.
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mother's cheerleading. 199 Competitive cheerleading is comparable to
gymnastics with strenuous tumbling runs, human pyramids, back flips,
lifts, catches, and tosses.2 °° Most competitive cheerleading does not even
involve vocal cheers and is performed to music. 20 1 Competitive
cheerleading "seems influenced by girl-power role models such 2as
02
Warrior Princess' and 'Buffy the Vampire Slayer.'
'Xena:
Competitive cheerleaders may be the best athletes in their respective
competitions are broadcast to national
schools, and cheerleading
20 3
television audiences.
Competitive cheerleading is widely practiced at both the high
school and collegiate levels. 204 At least eighty-five colleges offer some
form of scholarship for competitive cheerleading. °5 If the OCR
recognized competitive cheerleading as an athletic opportunity for
purposes of Title IX, existing substantial proportionality disparities may
be quickly reduced. I have had little success locating specific data on the
number of competitive cheerleading participants at any single Division I
school. However, a frequent argument of Title IX proponents is that
creating athletic opportunities at the intercollegiate level will have a
trickle down effect on high school participation. The logic is that more
younger athletes, or would-be athletes, will develop an interest in athletic
opportunities if more athletic opportunities are offered at a higher
level.20 6 Using this same logic, but looking from a different perspective,
it seems fair to argue that a high number of participants in a sport or
activity at the high school level indicates that there would be a high level
of interest in that sport or activity at the collegiate level.20 7

199.

Lisa M. Kreiger, Cheerleading: Sport Moves from Sidelines to Center Stage,

THE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 3, 2002, availableat
www.bayarea.com//mld/mercurynews/3996540.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2002).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Krieger, supra note 199. 1 would like to thank Dr. Susan Marsnik, Assistant
Professor of Legal Studies in Business at the University of St. Thomas, for additional
information on this point.
203. See generally Adrienne D. Coles, School Cheerleading Evolving into
Competitive

Activity,

EDUCATION

WEEK,

Apr.

26,

2000,

available

at

www.edweek.org/ew/ewprintstory.cfm?slug=33cheer.h 19 (last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
204. Between the 1993-94 and 1998-99 school years, high school squads'
participation in competitive cheerleading jumped from 27,500 to almost 60,000. Id.
205. See Krieger, supra note 199.
206. See Clark, supra note 156, at 7 ("People choose whether to play high school
sports for reasons which are influenced, directly and indirectly, by what sports are played
at higher levels.").
207. See Bauer, supra note 6, at 1004 ("[I]t makes little sense to offer a team at the
intercollegiate level that is not supported by high schools. The test for Title IX
compliance at the college level should, therefore, use high school sports participation
").
statistics as [a] guideline ....
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Michigan's Escabana High School has girls' competitive
cheerleading. °8 The school added competitive cheerleading when it
wanted to reinstate boys' baseball. 20 9 The OCR refused to recognize
competitive cheerleading as an athletic opportunity at Escabana.21 °
Escabana's male/female athletic opportunity disparity was 344 to 210, or
1.64 male athletic opportunities for every female opportunity. 21 I That
disparity is greater than the average disparity in Division I athletics of
1.4 male athletic opportunities per female opportunity. 2 2 If competitive
cheerleading had been accepted as a Title IX athletic opportunity,
Escabana would have reduced its male/female athletic opportunity
disparity from approximately 10 percent to 3.7 percent.21 3 If a similar
percentage of females is interested in competitive cheerleading at the
collegiate level, recognizing competitive cheerleading as a Title IX
athletic opportunity could quickly create substantial proportionality at
many schools.
There is no clear reason why the OCR has refused to recognize
competitive cheerleading as an athletic opportunity. By the OCR's own
admission,21 4 competitive cheerleading meets the criteria the OCR is
supposed to apply when determining if an activity constitutes a sport.25
Competitive cheerleading has a defined season, specific eligibility
requirements, standardized judging, championships,
scholarships, and it
2 16
is recognized as a sport by other entities.
It may simply be that the OCR feels that any kind of cheerleading
has "girlie" connotations, and perpetuates societal perceptions of women
208.

See Vanessa

McCray, Cheerleading Won't Solve Gender Equity in Esky

Schools, DAILY PRESS, Mar. 9, 2002, available at

www.dailypress.net/archives/mar2002/newsmar02/archivenews030902.html)
(last
visited Oct. 17, 2002).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
213. See McCray, supra note 209.
214. See, e.g., Letter from Harry A. Orris, Director, Cleveland Office of the United
States Department of Education Office of Civil Rights, to Ms. Suzanne M. Martin,
Assistant Director, Michigan High School Athletic Association (Oct. 18, 2001), available
at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/mhsaa-cheer.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2002)
(refusing to recognize competitive cheerleading as a sport despite stating, in response to a
request from the state of Michigan, "[the] material [you submitted] tends to support in
several ways the characterization of... competitive cheerleading as a Title IX sport in
that it specifies the season of sport, identifies the eligibility requirements and
standardized judging criteria used by registered officials, notes the availability of some
state and conference championships and scholarship monies, and certifies that this
activity is recognized as a sport by the [Michigan High School Athletic Association] and
interscholastic athletics conferences [existing] within Michigan.").
215. See supratext accompanying note 194.
216. See supra note 214.
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as lesser athletes. For whatever reason, the OCR simply refuses to
recognize competitive cheerleading as an athletic opportunity under Title
IX, and by extension, any other activity it may perceive as somehow
subjectively inappropriate regardless of definition or requirements. The
21 7
Title IX mantra has frequently been: "If you build it, they will come.,
In the case of competitive cheerleading, the mantra should be: "They are
already here, build it." The OCR objectively should apply its regulations
and interpretations as written, not as subjectively desired.
C. Apply the Three Prongs of the OCR's Policy InterpretationEqually
To Carry Out the Intent and Language of Title IX
"Rather this court finds the proper reading of the Policy
effective
analysis
under
proper
Interpretation-and the
accommodation-allowsfor considerationof allfactors listed therein in
determining whether the university has provided equal opportunity and
levels of competitionfor males andfemales. ,218
As previously discussed, the decision and analysis in Cohen has
reduced the OCR's three prong test for Title IX compliance to a single
prong test; schools will be compliant when they can demonstrate
substantial proportionality. I submit that the OCR and the courts should
allow a school to comply under any of the three prongs specified in the
Policy Interpretation's analysis, each prong should be given equal
weight, and any analysis should be interpreted in a manner that carries
219
out the intent and language of Title IX and its attendant regulations.
Some subtle, and not so subtle, changes must be made to the current
treatment of each of the prongs to achieve these objectives.
Whether intercollegiate level participation
Prong I:
opportunities for male and female students are provided in
numbers substantially proportionate to their respective
217.

See Lynch, supra note 84 (citing Dr. Lopiano who said, "'You treat sports the

same way, and girls are just as interested in playing as boys ....

.If you build it'...

'they will come."').
218. Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996).
219. It appears that the Bush Panel and I are in complete agreement on this
recommendation. The Bush Panel's Recommendation 23, approved by consensus,
proposes:
The designation of one part of the three part test as a "safe harbor" should be
abandoned in favor of a way of demonstrating compliance with the Title IX
participation requirement that treats each part of the test equally. In addition,
the evaluation of compliance should include looking at all three parts of the
test, in aggregate or in balance, as well as individually.
See supra note 1and accompanying text.
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enrollments.

°

Under Cohen, the only way an institution could be certain it was
Title IX compliant was to demonstrate substantial proportionality. At the
risk of further fanning the Title IX flames, the substantial proportionality
standard clearly creates a quota system 221 because an educational
220. See Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, supra note 13.
221. The Cohen court took great umbrage to Brown's contention that its decision was
turning Title IX into an affirmative action mechanism. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101
F.3d 155, 169 (1st Cir. 1996). "We emphasize two points at the outset. First,
notwithstanding Brown's persistent invocation of the inflammatory terms 'affirmative
action,' 'preference,' and 'quota,' this is not an affirmative action case." Id. "Title IX is
not an affirmative action statute; it is an anti-discrimination statute, modeled explicitly
after another anti-discrimination statute, Title VII. No aspect of the Title IX regime at
issue in this case-inclusive of the statute, the relevant regulation, and the pertinent
agency documents-mandates gender-based preferences or quotas, or specific timetables
for implementing numerical quotas." Id. The court preferred to think of the District
Court's decision as "gender-conscious relief." Id. at 171. According to the court,
affirmative action mechanisms historically have three components. First, a voluntary
undertaking to remedy past discrimination. Second, a specific group based preference or
numeric goals. Third, a specific timetable for achieving those goals. Id. I submit that the
court's decision in Cohen encompasses and approves all of these elements.
Generally speaking, it does not appear that schools are attempting to comply
with Title IX out of true altruism. Clearly they are doing so primarily out of fear of
losing federal funds. Having said that, schools are "voluntarily" changing their practices
to attempt to become Title IX compliant much as a private employer could "voluntarily"
implement an affirmative action plan to address past discrimination to avoid negative
publicity or consumer response.
Clearly Cohen established both a group based preference and a numerical goal
for Title IX. By creating a rebuttable presumption for compliance under Prong I, and
interpreting Prongs 11 and III in a manner that eventually leads them to Prong l's
substantial proportionality requirement, the Cohen court set a numeric requirement for
Title X compliance; schools are compliant when the percentage of female athletic
opportunities equals the percentage of females enrolled. The end result is that Title IX
has become, in the words of Rep. Maxine Waters, "the biggest quota you've ever seen."
See Lynch, supra note 84.
The court said nothing about the requirement of a timetable other than that Title
IX simply does not have one. That is not true. The court gave a great deal of deference
to the DED and OCR guidelines and Interpretations of Title IX. The final Title IX
regulation, signed by President Ford on July 21,1975, established a three-year window
for institutions to comply with Title IX. See supra note 28. Title IX has a timetable for
compliance and the primary way to comply is by demonstrating substantial
proportionality.
The OCR has also established quantifiable goals for Title IX compliance by
educational institutions. In May of 1983, President Clinton appointed Norma Cantu as
the Assistant Secretary of the OCR. In the first nineteen months of Cantu's tenure, the
OCR began reviewing 240 schools. No complaint had been filed against any of those
institutions. See Gavora, supra note 5, at 25. Ms. Cantu also directed the OCR to double
the number of complaints it investigated. Id. Ms. Gavora has a particular problem with
the agenda she believes Ms. Cantu set and the mechanisms she believes Ms. Cantu used
to pursue that agenda. See generally id.; Stolba, supra note 140 ("Norma Cantu came
from the civil rights establishment, the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund, and she
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institution cannot be certain it is Title IX compliant until a specific
number of female athletic opportunities has been created.2 22 The Cohen
court treated substantial proportionality as a "safe harbor," meaning that
proving substantial proportionality created a rebuttable presumption of
Title IX compliance.2 23 The problem with this presumption is that it
assumes that men and women have equal interests in athletic
opportunities 224 and that providing a percentage of athletic opportunities
that mirrors the gender composition of enrollment truly satisfies these
interests. I have not seen any evidence that supports either of these
assumptions. The substantial proportionality requirement is a valid
indicator of satisfaction of interests only if male and female interests in
athletic opportunities are equal. I submit that Prong I should be given no
more or less weight than the other two prongs of the final Policy
Interpretation until, and if, sufficient evidence exists to substantiate that
the levels of male and female athletic interests are equal. There is also
no reason to use Prong I satisfaction as a safe harbor until it is
that substantial proportionality equals
empirically demonstrated
225
interests.
of
satisfaction
was well schooled in using the courts to bring about the goals that she couldn't achieve
legislatively. And that's exactly what she did at the OCR.").
It appears to be more than a coincidence that, as Cohen was on appeal, the OCR
issued a Clarification Memorandum stating that "[i]f an institution has recently
eliminated an available team from the intercollegiate program, OCR will find that there is
sufficient interest, ability, and available competition to sustain the intercollegiate team in
that sport unless an instruction can provide strong evidence that interest, ability, or
available competition no longer exists." See Norma Cantu, Office for Civil Rights,
8,
available at
at
TEST,
PART
THREE
THE
GUIDANCE:
POLICY
http://bailiwick.lib.uiowa.edu/ge/draft.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2002). In light of the
great deference the court gave the DED and OCR, it had to find that Brown could not
meet Prong III as Brown eliminated women's programs that had sufficient interest,
ability, and available competition. OCR issued a further clarification of the three prong
test in 1995. "Under the [further clarification], although minor imbalances may be
acceptable as long as justified, a more than two percent difference would not be allowed."
Duffy, supra note 7, at 110. The courts give tremendous deference to the OCR's
guidance and regulations, and the OCR has clearly set quotas for Title IX.
222. 1 am not aware of a single educational institution that failed to comply with Title
IX when it demonstrated substantial proportionality.
223. Cohen, 101 F.3d. at 171.
224. See Bauer, supra note 6, at 1003 ("The primary problem with focusing on
substantial proportionality at the intercollegiate level is that it rests on the faulty
assumption that female college students are interested in athletics to the same degree as
their male counterparts."); see also Davidson & Kerr, supra note 110, at 3 ("[O]ne cannot
assume that the same percentage of women as men have an interest in participating in
varsity sports.").
225. See Abbott, supra note 157. The Bush Panel appeared to be sharply divided on
how to utilize or adapt substantial proportionality. The fifteen member panel deadlocked
at 7-7 (one member missed the vote) on a proposed recommendation that would have
allocated 50 percent of a school's athletic opportunities to males, 50 percent to females,
and allowed a variance of 2 to 3 percent for compliance. It appears that several who
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Prong II: Where the members of one sex have been and are
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the
institution can show a history and continuing practice of program
expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing
interests and abilities of that sex.226
I am arguing that Prong II should be treated equally with Prongs I
and Il1.
I also recognize that it is an incredibly difficult prong to
satisfy.227 Only one school, Syracuse University, complied with Title IX
by satisfying Prong 11.228 Few schools will be able to meet the current
229
"historic and continued expansion" standard defined in Cohen
because, not only must schools historically expand women's athletic
opportunities, they must do so right up until the present day.230 I submit
that Prong II compliance should be evaluated on a case by case basis
using objective criteria and recognizing that the language plainly
identifies "program expansion," not "program addition."
"Program addition" would direct a court or administrative agency to
simply determine if a school has added more women's athletic programs.
"Program expansion" should look at what a school has done in terms of
adding programs, what it has done with previously existing programs,
and when or with what frequency or regularity it has done things to
expand female athletic opportunities. As argued by Brown University in
Cohen,23 ' an assessment of program expansion under Prong II should
include evidence of improved coaching, increased number of coaches,

voted against this recommendation felt that approving it would also specifically approve
a form of quota. See Clark, supra note 156. The Bush Panel voted 14-0 against allowing
a school to comply by demonstrating that its male/female athletic participation was
within 3 percent of the high school male/female athletic participation ratio in the
appropriate region. Id.
226. See Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, supra note 13.
227. Although, at least one author would argue that it will be incredibly difficult to
satisfy either Prong II or III. See Starace, supra note 130; see also Roberts v. Colo. State
Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1993).
228. Carol A. Barr, Still Afloat, ATHLETIC BuSINESs, Oct. 1999, at 26, available at
http://www I .ncaa.org/membership/ed outreach/gender equity/resourcematerials/Resou
rces.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2002) ("Syracuse University has earned a place in the
annals of Title IX litigation as the first institution to use a safe-harbor defense that relies
on its ability to show a history and continuing practice of expanding opportunities for
women."). But see Gavora, supra note 5, at 38 (stating that three schools had achieved
compliance under Prong II, but not identifying the schools).
229. See Jurewitz, supra note 160, at 316.
230. Id.
231. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.1. 1992), afd,991 F.2d 888 (1st
Cir. 1993), on remandto 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 101
F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996).
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admissions preference for females athletes, and increased level of
wela as increased opportunities within an existing
competition, 232 as well
sport. Adding more athletic teams technically increases the number of
athletic opportunities available, but if these are not the opportunities that
truly address the interests of female would-be athletes, there is no real
increase in female athletic opportunities. On the other hand, developing
and expanding opportunities to reflect actual interest and participation
may truly expand female athletic opportunities.
Prong III: Where the members of one sex are under-represented
among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a
continuing practice of program expansion such as that cited
above, whether it can be fully demonstrated that the interests and
abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and
effectively accommodated by the present program. 33
Before I discuss this prong, I must make a clear and critically
important distinction; Title IX and its interpretations require that
educational institutions provide athletic opportunities that satisfy
interests,234 not that educational institutions provide an equal number of
athletic opportunities to both genders. 5 Prong III is an alternative to
Prong I's substantial proportionality requirement and Prong I's implicit
assumption that men's and women's athletic interests are equal.236 Prong
237
III recognizes that men's and women's athletic interests may differ.
Prong III allows an institution to satisfy Title IX by meeting those
interests without reaching substantial proportionality.
Pursuant to the OCR's final Policy Interpretation, an educational
institution must "accommodate effectively the interests and abilities of

232. Id.at 991.
233. See Title IXof the Educational Amendment of 1972, supra note 13.
234. Id.
235. Id. ("[I]t is achievement of 'equal opportunity' for which [schools] are
responsible and to which the final Policy Interpretation is addressed. If comparisons of
program components reveal that treatment, benefits, or opportunities are not equivalent in
kind, quality, or availability, a finding of compliance may still be justified if the
differences are the result of nondiscriminatory factors.").
236. See Lynch, supra note 84 ("Women's sports activists claim that in the absence of
discrimination, women would play sports in equal numbers to men."). The article goes
on to quote Dr. Lopiano: "You treat sports the same way, and girls are just as interested
in playing as boys." Id.
237. At least one representative of the OCR acknowledges that there may be different
levels of athletic interests between the genders. See Suggs, supra note 150 (citing Mary
Frances O'Shea of the OCR: "The beauty of Title IX is that it recognizes that fact.., that
there might not be proportionately as many people in one group who are interested in
athletics as in another group").
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students to the extent necessary to provide equal opportunity in the
selection of sports and levels of competition available to members of
both sexes., 238 The Cohen court misinterpreted this clear mandate and,
as a result, decreased the importance of the prong that was at least as
important as the others, and perhaps more important. The Cohen court
treats "interests" as an afterthought. Interests are not the priority that
must be met, interests are something to be considered if substantial
proportionality does not exist. The end result is that "interest analysis
becomes a fallback provision that is rarely, if ever, considered. 239
In Cohen, Brown University asserted an interpretation of Prong III
that was consistent with the historic intention of Title IX.240 Brown
argued that its athletic programs equally accommodated both genders,
and accordingly complied with Title IX because it accommodated the
interests and abilities of both its male and female students. 24' The court
termed this position the "Relative Interests" standard.2 42 Brown asserted
that Prong III was satisfied when an educational institution met the
interests and abilities of the underrepresented gender to the extent that it
met the interests and abilities of the overrepresented gender. 243 Inother
words, Brown recognized that in a world of finite financial resources no
group could get everything it wanted, but that the requirements of Title
LX were met when the genders were equally accommodated in pursuing
athletic interests. Obviously, the question then becomes whether or not
such interests can be measured.244
The OCR gives institutions great discretion in determining student

238. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
239. See Heller, supra note 87, at 201.
240. Bonnette, supra note 123, at 25. The 1990 Title IX Athletics Investigator's
Manual required investigators to determine "whether the [existing] programs equally
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of male and female athletes." Id.
241. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 174 (1st Cir. 1996).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Abbott, supra note 157. The Bush Panel seemed to struggle with the additional
question of when interest surveys can be used. The Panel voted 8-7 against a
recommendation that proposed "allowing institutions to conduct scientifically based
surveys to determine actual athletic interest of its student body on a continual basis." Id.
The Panel then voted 10-5 in favor of a recommendation "allow[ing] institutions to
conduct interest surveys as a way of demonstrating compliance with Title IX." Id.
Furthering the confusion, the Panel then approved, by consensus, Recommendation 21:
The [OCR] should study the possibility of allowing institutions to demonstrate
that they are in compliance with the third part of the three-part test by
comparing the ratio of male/female athletic participation at the institution with
the demonstrated interests and abilities shown by regional, state, or national
youth and high school participation rates or by the interest levels indicated in
surveys of prospected or enrolled students at that institution.
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athletic interests.24 5 At least one author has argued that it is difficult to
measure or ascertain interest in athletic opportunities.2 46 That may be
true, but that does not mean that determination is impossible or even
onerously burdensome.
It can even be argued that educational
institutions should bear the burden of collecting data on actual and
potential students' athletic interests to be more attuned to the true needs
and desires of their student body.247 The Pederson court recognized that
an educational institution can determine the athletic interests of its
students and provide the desired athletic opportunities.2 48 The court
provided methods for determining student interest, 249 and other authors
have recognized that data already exists that would help determine
interests.250
At least one school asserts that it has effectively
accommodated the athletic interests of women and complied with Title
IX under Prong 111.251

At least one author has argued that "adopting" the interest-based test
of Prong III would impede or destroy the development in women's sports
she attributes to Title IX. 252 There are three fundamental problems with
such a position. First, the courts and the OCR do not have to "adopt"
Prong III's interest-based analysis. The analysis has already been
adopted by the OCR when it was made part of the three prong test. The
courts and the OCR have simply failed to apply it. Second, the author
assumes that the increase in female athletic opportunities is a direct result
of Title IX and its interpretation. As previously discussed, it is not
possible to determine precisely what effect Title IX has had on the
growth of female athletics or female athletic opportunities. 25 3 Third,
245. Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, supra note 13 ("Institutions
may determine the athletic interests and abilities of students by nondiscriminatory
methods of their choosing .. "); see also Lamber, supra note 122, at 165 ("[The] OCR
expects institutional assessments to reach a wide audience and to be open-ended
regarding the sports in which students can express interest.").
246. Lamber, supra note 122, at 165-66.
247. See Earl Dudley & George Rutherglen, Ironies, Inconsistencies, and
IntercollegiateAthletics: Title IX, Title VII, and StatisticalEvidence of Discrimination,1
VA. J. SPORTS & L. 177, 223 (1999).

248. Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 914 (M.D. La. 1996) ("[T]his
court will not join in assuming athletic directors in this country are incapable of meeting
the burden of Title IX and its regulations which incorporates a knowledge regarding their
student body, effective analysis of and meeting students' needs, and filling those needs in
a non-discriminatory fashion.").
249. Id. at 915.
250.

See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 247, at 221-22.

251. See Lamber, supra note 122, at 210.
252. See Starace, supra note 130, at 218.
253. However, the author does raise a valid concern. If interests were measured and
the results showed that mens and women's athletic interests were not equal, the result
may well be that fewer athletic opportunities would be offered to women than men. See
Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 247.
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Title IX is designed to prevent disparities in higher education and,
because of later expansion, in intercollegiate athletics. 254 There is an
enormous difference between preventing disparity and mandating
numeric equality. That difference is recognized by the OCR's own 1990
Investigator's manual:
A disparity is a difference, on the basis of sex, in benefits or services,
that has a negative impact on athletes of one sex when compared with
benefits or services available to athletes of the other sex. A 2disparity
55
does not mean that benefits and services are merely different.
There is simply no evidence to substantiate the assumption that men
and women will display equal athletic interests in or for a particular
educational institution.2 56 As a result, differences between the number of
male and female athletic opportunities should occur and be warranted
when there is a difference between male and female athletic interest
levels. 57 This difference may well vary over time,258 but it does not
constitute a disparity because there is no negative impact on the gender

At first blush, women having fewer athletic opportunities than men sounds like
an undesirable result, but that result is only "bad" if you begin with the assumption that
those interests are or should be equal. As previously discussed, I have seen nothing to
demonstrate that hypothesis is true. Title IX requires that athletic interests of the
Effective
underrepresented gender be fully and effectively accommodated.
accommodation occurs when interests are determined and met. See id.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 20-26.
255. See Bonnette, supra note 123, at 10.
256. At least one author states as fact that males, as a group, have higher levels of
athletic interest than females as a group. See Robert D'Augustine, A Loosely Laced
Buskin? The Department of Education's Policy Interpretationfor Applying Title IX to
Intercollegiate Athletics, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 469, 498 (1996) ("[T]he current

reality is that males as a group have higher levels of interests in athletics than
females ... ").
257. See Abbott, supra note 157. The Bush Panel may have recognized this
contention as well. Its amended proposed Recommendation 15b reads:
If substantial proportionality is retained as a way of complying with Title IX,
the Office of Civil Rights should clarify the meaning of substantial
proportionality and allow for reasonable variance in the relative ratio of athletic
participation for men and women while adhering to the non- discriminatory
tenets of Title IX.
Id. The Panel voted 15-0 in favor of this recommendation. Id.
258. See D'Augustine, supra note 256 (proposing that schools adopt standards to
determine and meet the need for female athletic opportunities defined by interest). "The
standards must be responsive to actual levels of interest, yet they must be flexible so that,
as circumstances change, and females' interest in participating in athletics increases,
colleges and universities will be required to be responsive to such increased interest." Id.
I cannot agree with the assumption that women's interests will increase over time. They
may or may not. If they do, Prong III requires schools to offer athletic opportunities
meeting that increased interest. It would also allow a school to decrease opportunities
when interests decrease.
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receiving fewer opportunities. 259
They are still receiving the
opportunities that satisfy their demonstrated interest levels. 260 On the
other hand, cutting existing men's teams when adequate interest exists,
or failing to add men's opportunities when adequate interest exists, while
meeting women's interests, does create a disparity because there will be
a negative impact on opportunities provided to men when compared to
opportunities provided to women.261
There is little data currently available on the issue of men's and
women's interests in athletic opportunities, but at least one court has
262
recognized that men and women may have different athletic interests,

and the data that does exist seems to support that contention. 263
Additionally, in Cohen, Brown University presented the results of a
voluntary survey completed by high school students applying to
Brown. 264 The survey showed that 60 percent of those interested in
varsity sports at Brown were male, whereas 40 percent were female.26 5
Perhaps more significantly, a separate survey of prospective college
students showed that of the students interested in participating in
athletics, 57 percent were men and only 43 percent were women.266 At
the time Cohen was filed, Brown's men's teams were rejecting would-be
participants, while there were ninety-three unfilled spots on existing
women's teams.2 67
The number of athletes wanting to play on teams also bears out a
decided difference between men's and women's desire to participate in
259. The OCR's final Policy Interpretation recognizes that there may be situations
where a difference in the number of athletic opportunities exists, without discriminatory
intent also being present. See Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, supra
note 13 ("[The final Policy Interpretation] also provides guidance to assist institutions in
determining whether any disparities which may exist between men's and women's
programs are justifiable and nondiscriminatory.").
260. See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 247.
261. See D'Augustine, supra note 256, at 487 ("[L]ooking solely at the
accommodation
of the underrepresented sex. . . inevitably disadvantages the
overrepresented sex if, as is true in our society today, the usual overrepresented sex
actually does have a higher level of interest and ability in athletic competition.").
262. Kelly v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Requiring parallel teams
is a rigid approach that denies schools the flexibility to respond to the differing athletic
interests of men and women.").
263. Men's and women's interests in athletic opportunities may also be apparent to
those with expertise, and firsthand experience, in the field. See Lynch, supra note 84
(citing former OCR investigator Lamar Daniel: "There's no question in my mind that
women are less interested in sports than men. But logically, in my experience, you can't
prove that").
264. See Gavora, supra note 5 (citing Alison Lobron & Lockhart Steele, Lies,
DamnedLies and Statistics?, BROWN DAILY HERALD, Nov. 14, 1994).
265. Id
266. Id. at 27.
267. Id. at 79.
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intercollegiate athletics. An average men's indoor track team will attract
thirty-two members; the corresponding female team will attract twentyseven. 268 On average, twenty-two women participate on a lacrosse team,
while thirty-one men do.269 Women's softball averages eighteen
participants, while men's baseball averages thirty.27 ° Male athletes may
also be willing to "make do" with less simply in order to have the
opportunity to participate in athletics.2 7' Male athletes may simply place
a higher priority on athletic involvement 272 and that involvement may be
longer term.273
The Cohen court did not accept Brown University's "Relative
Interests" approach or any data supporting that contention.274 Despite the
court's embrace of statistical analysis to determine substantial probability
under Prong I, the court was clear that it would not accept any statistical
evidence offered to support differences in men's and women's desire to
The Cohen courts clearly
participate in intercollegiate athletics.

268. Id. at 69.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., Lori Nickel, Title IX Proving To Be More Fatal, JSONLINE, Nov. 7,
2001, at www.jsonline.com/sports/coll/novOl/titleixO71107Ol.asp (last visited July 2,
2002) (discussing the sacrifices the Marquette men's wrestling team and coaches made
simply to survive).
Incredibly the program survived another seven years without a dime from the
school because of loyal alumni who raised scholarship money themselves. The
coach made more money at his second job as a personal trainer. Two or three
scholarships were shared among all 33 wrestlers on the roster, barely putting a
dent in Marquette's $18,000 a year tuition.
Id.
272. Perhaps the best indication of the desire to play sports at the intercollegiate level
is shown in intramural sports participation. Intramural participants play voluntarily.
Nearly 80 percent of intramural participants are male. See Lynch, supra note 84 (citing a
1994 study by Pacey Economics). Another objective indicator of athletic interests may
be "walk-on" participation. At least one survey showed that men compete as walk-ons
three times as often as women. See Debra E. Plum, An Intense Debate Over "Walk-Ons,"
14,
1993,
available at
HIGHER
EDUC.,
July
CHRONICLE
OF
THE
http://chronicle.com/indepth/titleixbackground.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2003). But see
Farrell, supra note 88, at 1049-50 (identifying five reasons there are likely more male
than females walk-ons: more opportunities, more males are recruited to be walk-ons,
increased likelihood of having experienced coaching, existing sports are male-dominated,
and greater rewards are available for male walk-ons).
273. See Michael Straubel, Gender Equity, College Sports, Title IX and GroupRights:
A Coach's View, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1039, 1043 (1996) (arguing that females withdraw
from athletics at a much higher rate than males between the ages of twelve and fourteen).
274. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 179-80 (1st Cir. 1996) ("The court has
been especially critical of the use of statistical evidence offered to prove generalized,
stereotypical notions about men and women. We conclude that, even if it can be
empirically demonstrated that, at a particular time, women have less interest in sports
than do men, such evidence, standing alone, cannot justify providing fewer athletic
opportunities for women than men.").

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:2

struggled to refute Brown's pragmatic contentions and contradicted both
themselves and Title IX repeatedly. 275 The court, while not stating it
expressly, was clearly adhering to the oft-repeated adage: "If you build
276
it, they will come.,

At least one source casts doubt on the mantra and the court's
implicit rationale. The 2000 Gender Equity Report prepared by the
United States General Accounting Office found that the number of
women's teams and the number of women's athletic participants has
continually risen since the mid-1980s, but at a rate close to equal to the
overall increase in female enrollment.27 7 In light of this information, it
may not be the case that more women have become interested in athletic
opportunities at the intercollegiate level; it may be that more women are
at that level, while the percentage with interest in athletics remains
relatively constant. If this latter contention is true, schools will find it
even more difficult to comply with Title IX in the future. Prong I
requires substantial proportionality. At least one projection has shown
that women will make up 58 percent of undergraduate enrollment by
2009.278 To be substantially proportionate, a school will have to provide
well more than half (58 percent) of its athletic opportunities to a gender
that does not seem interested in filling that many spots, at least with the
opportunities currently approved by the OCR.
III.

Conclusion

At the beginning of this Article, I referred to Title IX as an Act that
has spawned strong opinions and loud debate. Through the course of this
Article, I have discussed the fact that the two common beliefs underlying
those opinions and that debate are not supported by empirical evidence.
275. See, e.g., id. at 167 (embracing Title VII as a model for Title IX). "The drafters
of Title IX explicitly assumed that [Title IX] would be interpreted and applied as Title
VII had been during the preceding eight years." Id.(quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi.,
441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979)). The court also distanced Title VII from Title IX when it did
not suit the court's purpose or rationale. "It does not follow from the fact that 168 1(b) [of
Title IX] was patterned after a Title VII provision that Title VII standards should be
applied to a Title IX analysis of whether an intercollegiate athletics program equally
accommodates both genders ....
" Id. at 176. But see Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d
881, 897 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that the legislative history of Title IX clearly suggests
that the standards developed for Title VII are to apply to Title IX). The Cohen court
treated statistical analysis in a similarly irreconcilable fashion, rejecting such analysis
under Prong III but adopting it under Prong I "because Brown maintains a 13.01%
disparity between female participation in intercollegiate athletics and female enrollment,
it cannot gain the protection of prong one." Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185,
211 (D.R.I. 1995), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (lst Cir. 1996).
276. Lynch, supra note 84. This adage is a favorite of Dr. Lopiano's. See supra note
217 and accompanying text; supra note 109.
277.

See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 51, at 16.

278.

Id.at 10.
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However, the ambiguity surrounding Title IX, and the appropriateness of
its past use and intertpretation, continues. When asked about some of the
proposals being reviewed by the Bush Panel, one Title IX proponent
responded that any change to Title IX "would enshrine the principle that
providing something less than equal opportunity can be treated as equal
opportunity without further explanation., 279
That quote may
simultaneously define each side of the Title IX debate because each side
focuses on "equal opportunity" with very different images of the end
results of those definitions. Those "for" Title IX maintain that anything
less than substantial proportionality means less than equal opportunity
for women to enage in intercollegiate athletics. Those "against" Title IX
maintain that male athletes are provided less than equal opportunity
when viable programs with interested and participating male athletes are
terminated in the pursuit of substantial proportionality.
Title IX was created to prevent gender based discrimination that
resulted in women having disproportionately fewer opportunities to
pursue higher education. There are now more women than men pursuing
higher education in the United States.28 0 Intercollegiate athletics was not
the intended focus of Title IX; Title IX was expanded by the OCR and
the courts to encompass intercollegiate athletics. While the OCR and the
courts may have acted with good intentions, the result has been to
replace objective analysis with subjective morality. Much of the current
treatment of Title IX rests on the unproven assumption that females and
males have equal interests in athletic opportunities. That assumption has
turned Title IX from a law requiring the effective accommodation of
interests and abilities to one mandating numerically equal athletic
opportunities, regardless of interests or abilities. In turn, the proritization
of strict numerical equality has created the Orwellian dilemma2 8 ' that has
been discussed by this Article and must be addressed by those deciding
Title IX's future.

279. Scholarship Cuts Possible, ST. PAUL STAR TRIBUNE, Jan. 24, 2003, at C2.
280. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 51, at 9.
281. "All animals are equal[,] but some animals are more equal than others." GEORGE
ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 148 (1954).

